1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
3	
4	IN RE: AUTOMOTIVE WIRE HARNESS SYSTEMS ANTITRUST
5	MDL NO. 2311
6	/
7	STATUS CONFERENCE / MOTION HEARINGS / FAIRNESS HEARINGS
8	
9	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARIANNE O. BATTANI United States District Judge
10	Theodore Levin United States Courthouse 231 West Lafayette Boulevard Detroit, Michigan
11	Decrore, Michigan
12	APPEARANCES: Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs:
13	
14	THOMAS C. BRIGHT GOLD, BENNET, CERA & SIDENER, L.L.P.
15	595 Market Street, Suite 2300 San Francisco, CA 94105
16	(415) 777-2230
17	DAVID H. FINK
18	FINK & ASSOCIATES LAW 100 West Long Lake Road, Suite 111
19	Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304 (248) 971-2500
20	NACTION, CITATO
21	NATHAN FINK FINK & ASSOCIATES LAW
22	100 West Long Lake Road, Suite 111 Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304
23	(248) 971-2500
24	
25	

```
APPEARANCES: (Continued)
 1
     Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs:
 2
     GREGORY P. HANSEL
 3
     PRETI, FLAHERTY, BELIVEAU & PACHIOS, L.L.P.
     One City Center
     Portland, ME
                    04112
 4
     (207) 791-3000
 5
     STEVEN A. KANNER
 6
     FREED, KANNER, LONDON & MILLEN, L.L.C.
 7
     2201 Waukegan Road, Suite 130
     Bannockburn, IL 60015
 8
     (224) 632-4502
 9
     JOSEPH C. KOHN
10
     KOHN, SWIFT & GRAF, P.C.
     One South Broad Street, Suite 2100
11
     Philadelphia, PA 19107
     (215) 238-1700
12
13
     MICHAEL S. SMITH
     PRETI, FLAHERTY, BELIVEAU & PACHIOS, L.L.P.
14
     One City Center
     Portland, ME
                   04112
15
     (207) 791-3000
16
     EUGENE A. SPECTOR
17
     SPECTOR, ROSEMAN, KODROFF & WILLIS, P.C.
     1818 Market Street, Suite 2500
18
     Philadelphia, PA 19103
     (215) 496-0300
19
20
     RANDALL B. WEILL
     PRETI, FLAHERTY, BELIVEAU & PACHIOS, L.L.P.
21
     One City Center
     Portland, ME 04112
22
     (207) 791-3000
23
24
25
```

```
APPEARANCES: (Continued)
 1
     End-Payor Plaintiffs:
 2
     DEVON ALLARD
 3
     THE MILLER LAW FIRM, P.C.
     950 West University Drive, Suite 300
     Rochester, MI 48307
 4
     (248) 841-2200
 5
 6
     E. POWELL MILLER
     THE MILLER LAW FIRM, P.C.
 7
     950 West University Drive, Suite 300
     Rochester, MI 48307
     (248) 841-2200
 8
 9
     WILLIAM V. REISS
     ROBINS, KAPLAN, MILLER & CIRESI, L.L.P.
10
     601 Lexington Avenue, Suite 3400
11
     New York, NY 10022
     (212) 980-7405
12
     HOLLIS L. SALZMAN
13
     ROBINS, KAPLAN, MILLER & CIRESI, L.L.P.
14
     601 Lexington Avenue, Suite 3400
     New York, NY 10022
15
     (212) 980-7405
16
     STEVEN M. SHEPARD
17
     SUSMAN GODFREY, L.L.P
     190 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 950
18
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     (310) 789-3102
19
20
     ELIZABETH T. TRAN
     COTCHETT, PITRE & McCARTHY, L.L.P.
21
     840 Malcolm Road
     Burlingame, CA 94010
22
     (650) 697-6000
23
     ADAM J. ZAPALA
     COTCHETT, PITRE & McCARTHY, L.L.P.
24
     840 Malcolm Road
     Burlingame, CA
                     94010
25
     (650) 697–6000
```

```
APPEARANCES: (Continued)
 1
     Dealership Plaintiffs:
 2
     DON BARRETT
 3
     BARRETT LAW OFFICES
     P.O. Drawer 927
     Lexington, MS 39095
 4
      (601) 834-2376
 5
 6
     ALEXANDER E. BLUM
     MANTESE, HONIGMAN, ROSSMAN & WILLIAMSON, P.C.
 7
      1361 East Big Beaver Road
     Troy, MI 48083
 8
      (248) 457-9200
 9
     ERICA FRUITERMAN
10
     DUANE MORRIS, L.L.P.
      30 South 17th Street
     Philadelphia, PA 19103
11
      (215) 979–1342
12
13
     EVELYN LI
     CUNEO, GILBERT & LaDUCA, L.L.P.
14
      507 C Street NE
     Washington, D.C.
                        20002
15
      (202) 789-3960
16
     J. MANLY PARKS
17
     DUANE MORRIS, L.L.P.
      30 South 17th Street
18
     Philadelphia, PA 19103
      (215) 979-1342
19
20
     VICTORIA ROMANENKO
     CUNEO, GILBERT & LaDUCA, L.L.P.
21
      507 C Street NE
     Washington, D.C.
                        20002
22
      (202) 789-3960
23
24
25
```

```
APPEARANCES: (Continued)
 1
     For the Defendants:
 2
     JEFFREY J. AMATO
 3
     WINSTON & STRAWN, L.L.P.
     200 Park Avenue
     New York, NY 10166
 4
     (212) 294-4685
 5
 6
     MATTHEW BACHRACH
     CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON, L.L.P.
 7
     2000 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
     Washington, D.C.
                        20006
 8
     (202) 974-1500
 9
     MICHAEL G. BRADY
10
     WARNER, NORCROSS & JUDD, L.L.P.
     2000 Town Center, Suite 2700
11
     Southfield, MI 48075
     (248) 784-5032
12
13
     STEVEN F. CHERRY
     WILMER HALE
14
     1875 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
     Washington, D.C. 20006
15
     (202) 663-6321
16
     EILEEN M. COLE
17
     WHITE & CASE, L.L.P.
     701 Thirteenth Street NW
18
     Washington, DC 20005
     (202) 626-3642
19
20
     JAMES L. COOPER
     ARNOLD & PORTER, L.L.P.
21
     555 Twelfth Street NW
     Washington, DC 20004
22
     (202) 942-5000
23
     KENNETH R. DAVIS, II
     LANE POWELL, P.C.
24
     601 SW Second Avenue, Suite 2100
25
     Portland, OR 97204
     (503) 778-2100
```

```
APPEARANCES: (Continued)
 1
     For the Defendants:
 2
     MICHAEL R. DEZSI
 3
     DETIMER & DEZSI, P.L.L.C.
      615 Griswold Street, Suite 1600
     Detroit, Michigan 48226
 4
      (313) 879–1206
 5
 6
     DAVID P. DONOVAN
     WILMER HALE
 7
      1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
     Washington, D.C.
                        20006
 8
      (202) 663-6868
 9
     ABRAM ELLIS
10
      SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, L.L.P.
      1155 F Street, N.W.
11
     Washington, D.C. 20004
      (202) 636-5579
12
13
     J. CLAYTON EVERETT, JR.
     MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, L.L.P.
14
      1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
     Washington, DC 20004
15
      (202) 739-5860
16
     KEVIN FEE
17
     SIDLEY AUSTIN, L.L.P.
      One South Dearborn Street
18
     Chicago, IL 60603
      (312) 853-4155
19
20
     DANIEL T. FENSKE
     JENNER & BLOCK
      353 N. Clark Street
21
     Chicago, IL 60654-3456
22
      (312) 222-9350
23
     LOUIS GABEL
     JONES DAY
24
     150 West Jefferson, Suite 2100
     Detroit, MI 48226
25
      (313) 733–3939
```

```
APPEARANCES: (Continued)
 1
     For the Defendants:
 2
     LARRY S. GANGNES
 3
     LANE POWELL, P.C.
      1420 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4100
     Seattle, Washington 98101
 4
      (206) 223-7000
 5
 6
     JASON R. GOURLEY
     BODMAN P.L.C.
 7
      1901 Street Antoine Street, 6th Floor
     Detroit, MI 48226
 8
      (313) 259-7777
 9
     FRED K. HERRMANN
10
     KERR, RUSSELL & WEBER, P.L.C.
      500 Woodward Avenue, Suite 2500
11
     Detroit, MI 48226
      (313) 961-0200
12
13
     ELLEN MAXWELL-HOFFMAN
     BOWLES RICE
14
      600 Quarrier Street
      Charleston, WV 25325
15
      (304) 343-2867
16
     HOWARD B. IWREY
17
     DYKEMA GOSSETT, P.L.L.C.
      39577 Woodward Avenue, Suite 300
18
     Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304
      (248) 203-0526
19
20
     JEFFREY L. KESSLER
     WINSTON & STRAWN, L.L.P.
21
      200 Park Avenue
     New York, NY 10166
      (212) 294-4655
22
23
     FRANKLIN LISS
24
     ARNOLD & PORTER, L.L.P.
      555 Twelfth Street NW
25
     Washington, DC 20004
      (202) 942-5000
```

```
APPEARANCES: (Continued)
 1
     For the Defendants:
 2
     CARL L. MALM
 3
     CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON, L.L.P.
     2000 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
     Washington, D.C. 20006
 4
      (202) 974-1959
 5
 6
     MICHELLE A. MANTINE
     REED SMITH, L.L.P.
 7
     225 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1200
     Pittsburgh, PA 15222
 8
     (412) 288-4268
 9
     RONALD M. McMILLAN
     CALFEE, HALTER & GRISWOLD, L.L.P.
10
     1405 East Sixth Street
11
     Cleveland, OH 44114
     (216) 622-8621
12
     STEFAN M. MEISNER
13
     MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY
14
     500 North Capitol Street, NW
     Washington, DC 20001
15
     (202) 756-8000
16
     MARK MILLER
17
     BAKER BOTTS, L.L.P.
     1299 Pennsylvania Ave NW
18
     Washington, DC 20004
     (202) 639-7714
19
20
     W. TODD MILLER
     BAKER & MILLER, P.L.L.C.
21
     2401 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 300
     Washington, DC 20037
22
     (202) 663 - 7822
23
     BRIAN M. MOORE
     DYKEMA GOSSETT, P.L.L.C.
24
     39577 Woodward Avenue, Suite 300
     Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304
25
     (248) 203-0772
```

```
APPEARANCES: (Continued)
 1
     For the Defendants:
 2
     GARY MOUW
 3
     VARNUM, L.L.P.
      333 Bridge Street NW
     Grand Rapids, MI 49504
 4
      (616) 336-7000
 5
 6
     GEORGE A. NICOUD, III
     GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, L.L.P.
 7
      555 Mission Street
      San Francisco, CA 94105
 8
      (415) 393-8200
 9
     KEITH PALFIN
10
     WINSTON & STRAWN, L.L.P.
      200 Park Avenue
11
     New York, NY 10166
      (212) 294-4743
12
13
     JOSEPH E. PAPELIAN
     DELPHI CORPORATION
14
      5725 Delphi Drive
      Troy, MI 48098
15
      (248) 813-2535
16
     JOHN ROBERTI
17
     ALLEN & OVERY, L.L.P.
      1101 New York Avenue, NW
18
     Washington, DC 20005
      (212) 683-3682
19
20
     MICHAEL RUBIN
     ARNOLD & PORTER, L.L.P.
21
     555 Twelfth Street NW
     Washington, DC 20004
22
      (202) 942-5094
23
     LARRY J. SAYLOR
24
     MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK & STONE, P.L.C.
      150 West Jefferson Avenue, Suite 2500
25
     Detroit, MI 48226
      (313) 496-7986
```

```
APPEARANCES: (Continued)
 1
     For the Defendants:
 2
      SCOTT T. SEABOLT
 3
     SEABOLT LAW FIRM
      17199 N. Laurel Park Drive, Suite 215
     Livonia, MI 48152
 4
      (248) 717-1302
 5
 6
     MICHAEL LEONARD SIBARIUM
     PILLSBURY , WINTHROP, SHAW, PITTMAN, L.L.P.
 7
      1200 Seventeenth Street, NW
     Washington, DC 20036-3006
 8
      (202) 663-9202
 9
     PRIYA SRINVASAN
10
     WHITE & CASE
     1221 Avenue of the Americas
11
     New York, NY 10020
      (212) 819-2624
12
13
     ANITA STORK
     COVINGTON & BURLING, L.L.P.
14
     One Front Street
     San Francisco, CA 94111
15
     (415) 591-7050
16
     JOANNE GEHA SWANSON
17
     KERR, RUSSELL & WEBER, P.L.C.
      500 Woodward Avenue, Suite 2500
18
     Detroit, MI 48226
      (313) 961-0200
19
20
     JOHN TANSKI
     AXINN, VELTROP & HARKRIDER
     950 F Street, NW
21
     Washington, DC 20004
22
      (202) 912-4700
23
     LARA TRAGER
24
     WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, L.L.P.
      767 Fifth Avenue
25
     New York, NY 10153
      (212) 310-8281
```

```
APPEARANCES: (Continued)
 1
     For the Defendants:
 2
     MICHAEL F. TUBACH
 3
     O'MELVENY & MYERS, L.L.P.
     Two Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor
     San Francisco, CA 94111
 4
      (415) 984-8700
 5
 6
     LINDSEY ROBINSON VAALA
     VINSON & ELKINS, L.L.P.
 7
      2200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 500 West
     Washington, DC 20037
 8
      (202) 639-6585
 9
     A. PAUL VICTOR
10
     WINSTON & STRAWN, L.L.P.
      200 Park Avenue
11
     New York, NY 10166
      (212) 294-4655
12
13
     OTHER APPEARANCES:
     Non-Party Original Equipment Manufacturers:
14
     ELLIOT H. SCHERKER
15
     GREENBERG TRAURIG, L.L.P
      3333 Piedmont Road NE, 25th Floor
16
     Atlanta, GA 30305
      (678) 553-2100
17
18
     DOMINIC SURPRENANT
     QUINN, EMANUEL, URQUHART, OLIVER & SULLIVAN, L.L.P.
19
     865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90017
20
      (213) 443-3000
21
22
23
24
25
```

1	TABLE OF CONTENTS
2	Page
3	Report of Master13
4	Status Conference14
5	Motion Hearings Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs' Motion to
6	Exclude Portions of the Expert Report and Opinions of Kevin McCloskey
7	opinions of hevin hectoskey
8	<u>Fairness Hearings</u> Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs' Motion for
9	Final Approval of Proposed Settlement with Minebea Defendants and Award of Attorneys'
10	Fees and Litigation Costs and Expenses84
11	Truck and Equipment Dealer Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Proposed
12	Settlement with Mitsubishi Electric and Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of
13	Litigation Costs and Expenses98
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
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Detroit, Michigan
 1
 2
     February 28, 20189
 3
     At about 10:03 a.m.
 4
               (Court and Counsel present.)
 5
               THE CASE MANAGER: Please rise.
 6
               The United States District Court for the Eastern
 7
 8
     District of Michigan is now in session, the Honorable
 9
     Marianne O. Battani presiding.
10
               You may be seated.
11
               The Court calls Case No. 12-md-02311,
12
     In Re: Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation.
1.3
                           Thank you, Kay. Good morning.
               THE COURT:
14
               THE ATTORNEYS:
                               (Collectively) Good morning.
15
               THE COURT: We ordered this nice weather compared
16
     to all of our snow for you, so I was glad to see that. I got
17
     a little worried the last few weeks but we're okay.
18
               All right. Let's start with the report from the
19
     Special Master. Mr. Esshaki?
20
               MASTER ESSHAKI: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you very
21
     much. Good morning, everybody.
22
               I can report that the motions before the Special
23
     Master seem to be dwindling, which is a good thing, and I
24
     think that's a natural occurrence of the fact that we have
     handled as of yesterday 78 of those, and in so handling them,
25
```

```
we have expressed the views of how we will handle those style
 1
 2
     motions so they can be used for precedent when they come up
 3
     in other cases. So that I believe is the reason that the
     motions are dwindling down.
 4
 5
               Yesterday, as I said, we handled motion number 78,
     the Denso motion, we made a ruling on that, the order is to
 6
     follow.
              I'm aware that there was a motion to compel Tokai
 7
 8
     Rika to produce -- or discovery against Tokai Rika which has
 9
     been held in abeyance or withdrawn. I am not aware of any
10
     other motions that have been currently filed.
11
               Has anyone on any other motions that I'm not aware
     of that have been filed for consideration by the Master?
12
13
               (No response.)
               MASTER ESSHAKI: I don't think so, so that's the
14
15
     extent of it, Your Honor.
16
               THE COURT: Okay. Does anybody have any questions
     or comments for the Master?
17
18
               (No response.)
19
               THE COURT: All right. Thank you much.
20
               The next item is the status of the settlements.
21
     Good morning.
22
               MS. SALZMAN: Good morning, Your Honor.
23
     Hollis Salzman for the end payor plaintiffs.
24
               I'm pleased to report the indirect purchaser
25
     plaintiffs, that is the end payors and the auto dealers,
```

2

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we've been working very hard in the case, working through
discovery issues, but we also are pleased to present that we
have since the last status conference 22 new settlements.
Some of those are not yet public but we will be filing
preliminary approval papers with the Court we hope in short
       That brings the number of cases that are fully
settled up to 28.
         THE COURT:
                     I'm sorry.
         MS. SALZMAN: 28, leaving 13 cases remaining to be
fully settled. Of those 13 cases, those cases all have at
least one settling defendant, and ten of those cases only
have a single defendant remaining in them. We currently have
only ten remaining defendants in the indirect purchaser
plaintiff cases.
         And we -- just skipping to the next bullet point on
your agenda to round it out, we have been working, the
indirect purchaser plaintiffs and the defendants, the ten
remaining defendants, have been working diligently with the
Settlement Master exchanging the necessary discovery or
working through issues to exchange the necessary discovery
and to tee those cases up for mediation.
         THE COURT: Let me see if I understand this.
the end payors --
         MS. SALZMAN: Yes.
         THE COURT: -- you have in total ten remaining
```

```
defendants?
 1
 2
               MS. SALZMAN: Correct.
 3
               THE COURT:
                          In how many parts?
               MS. SALZMAN: In 13 cases. Some of those
 4
     defendants are in multiple cases.
 5
                          And you are working with the --
 6
               THE COURT:
               MS. SALZMAN: We are working with the
 7
 8
     Settlement Master, Judge Weinstein. Not all the cases are
     mediated with him. If the parties want to use another
 9
10
     mediator, we do so, but it all gets coordinated through his
11
     office.
               THE COURT: Okay. And as to the auto dealers?
12
13
               MR. BARRETT: Good morning, Your Honor. This is
     Don Barrett for the auto dealers.
14
               We work hand in hand with the end payors and have
15
     for -- since this case started as far as settlements are
16
17
     concerned, and everything that Hollis said is correct.
               The only thing that I would add is that there is
18
19
     one defendant that sticks out, and that's Toyoda Gosei. They
20
     are the sole defendant in six of the remaining cases.
21
     they -- I don't know, it seems like when I was a little boy
22
     and I fished a lot, there was -- you know, we had cricket
23
     boxes in the south, and it always seemed like the last two or
24
     three crickets were the hardest ones to catch, but we always
     did.
25
```

```
THE COURT: All right. Defendants, do you hear
 1
            Who is the cricket in here? I don't know. Okay.
 2
     that?
 3
     Thank you.
                             Thank you, Your Honor.
               MS. SALZMAN:
 4
                           Thank you very much.
 5
               THE COURT:
               MR. KANNER: Good morning, Your Honor.
 6
 7
     Steve Kanner on behalf of the direct purchaser plaintiffs.
 8
               I'm pleased to tell the Court that we are currently
 9
     concluding settlements, some of which have been sitting
     around for a little too long, and by -- what I mean when I
10
11
     say concluding, it involves the fine points of the settlement
     agreement, things like cooperation clauses, production of
12
     additional materials at trial, if that's necessary.
1.3
               Nonetheless, Your Honor, these three settlements,
14
     and that doesn't include the one that was submitted to the
15
16
     Court yesterday, that was with respect to Tokai Rika, we
17
     filed a motion for preliminary approval which effectively
18
     concludes the active OSS litigation. I say effectively
19
     because, of course, Takata is in bankruptcy, and our
20
     colleagues have been active with the bankruptcy court and in
21
     perfecting our claim, and we do expect the class to receive
22
     some benefit as a result of our activity in the bankruptcy
23
             So OSS seems to be, with the exception of the
24
     bankruptcy matter, off the books.
25
               Now, with respect to the settlements --
```

```
1
               THE COURT:
                          Do you have some exception in the
     bankruptcy court to continue this action or discussions
 2
 3
     with --
               MR. KANNER: We have. We filed a claim, we are
 4
 5
     discussing this with Tokai Rika bankruptcy counsel.
               THE COURT:
 6
                           Takata.
 7
               MR. KANNER: Takata's bankruptcy counsel. Excuse
 8
     me.
 9
               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
10
               MR. KANNER: And I do -- I'm optimistic with
11
     respect to the amount, I don't know, but there will be some
     benefit to the class.
12
13
               THE COURT: Okay.
               MR. KANNER: Now, the settlements I was referring
14
15
     to, the three additional settlements, they cover nine
     separate cases, and we are truly in the final settlement
16
17
     stages of concluding any agreements that are out there, and I
18
     expect to report to the Court -- I expect the Court to hear
19
     from us certainly within the next few weeks as motions for
20
     preliminary approval are filed.
21
               THE COURT: All right. Now, there I know was a
22
     requirement that directs submit dates for mediation on all
23
     parts. How is that?
24
               MR. KANNER: Indeed, Your Honor. Judge Weinstein
25
     created a new sense of urgency which has created a momentum
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to remove the remaining cases into that posture. And that
includes all cases with live complaints that have been served
or otherwise not subject to binding arbitration. And we are,
in fact, in multiple discussions with multiple defendants to
coordinate those dates. I believe March 16th or 17th is our
deadline to get back to Judge Weinstein and report on who we
are going to be mediating before, the dates and related
information. So we are moving ahead.
         THE COURT:
                     Thank you.
         MR. KANNER:
                      Thank you very much, Judge.
         THE COURT: A little faster, please.
         MR. KANNER: Well, that's right. It is -- actually
it is much faster now with these --
                     It is moving faster now.
         THE COURT:
         MR. KANNER: Thank you.
         THE COURT:
                    Okay.
         MR. PARKS: Good morning, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: Good morning.
                                    TEDs.
         MR. PARKS:
                    Manly Parks, from Duane Morris, on
behalf of the truck and equipment dealer plaintiffs.
         We have three truck and equipment dealer plaintiff
cases with claims remaining. One of those three cases is
occupant safety systems, and the claim relates to Takata, and
as Your Honor knows, that's bound up in the bankruptcy
proceeding, and we are, as other plaintiffs' counsel in the
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1.3

other classes, are involved in those discussions and perfecting our claims there and that will take its course.

With respect to radiators, one of the two other remaining cases, we have reached an executed settlement agreement with Mitsuba, and we will be filing a motion for preliminary approval of that settlement with the Court. What we are hopeful of doing, and we have ongoing settlement discussions with the last remaining defendant in radiators, and should we be able to reach a settlement there, ideally we'll be able to present the Court with a motion for preliminary approval of those two settlements together, and that's becomes important from the perspective of trying to mitigate the cost of notice, which are significant given the size of the potential class here, and to the extent that we can bundle those notices together, we will try to do that.

That leaves starters and alternators, which we think of as kind of a single case for discussion purposes and administrative purposes. There are two remaining defendants there, and we have ongoing active settlement discussions with the involvement of the mediators as to both defendants there. So in sum, we have four total remaining defendants in three parts cases.

THE COURT: Four defendants in three parts. Okay

MR. PARKS: And one of those four defendants is Takata, so that's kind of a special case.

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THE COURT:
                          And you are mediating or have dates
 1
 2
     for --
 3
                          We are actively involved with the
               MR. PARKS:
     mediators. We -- as to one of the three defendants, putting
 4
     aside Takata, we have not had a mediation that I would
 5
     describe as a hearing but rather it was a full briefing of
 6
     the positions. As to the other two, we've been moving
 7
 8
     forward sufficiently, I quess, in the judgment of the
 9
     mediators, with our sort of offers and demands process that
10
     they haven't seen fit yet to schedule a mediation because the
11
     conversations continue to be moving forward at a reasonable
     pace, although we do give reports to the mediators probably
12
1.3
     every two weeks or so on where things stand and whether the
     ball continues to move forward or not, so they are actively
14
     monitoring. And we are working with Jed Melnick and Simone
15
     Lelchuk from Judge Weinstein's team on those.
16
17
                          Okay. Thank you very much.
               THE COURT:
               MR. PARKS: You're welcome.
18
19
               THE COURT:
                           Thank you. Those were very good
20
     reports. I also appreciate the written report. Who is doing
21
     this again?
22
               MR. SHEPARD: Good morning, Your Honor.
23
               THE COURT: Good morning.
24
               MR. SHEPARD: My name is Steven Shepard with the
25
     firm Susman Godfrey.
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On behalf of end payor plaintiffs, we are grateful
to the Court for recent approvals of the preliminary approval
motions that had been filed. We know how busy the Court is,
and we saw that five of the seven that were outstanding were
entered in just the last few days.
         We're happy to report that the round three notice
motion has been unopposed by the 32 round three defendants
who are in the motion, and we look forward to getting started
soon on the notice program, which, as Your Honor will have
seen, is closely modeled on the programs previously approved
by the Court for round two and round one.
         THE COURT: Okay. You had a date of August 18th?
         MR. SHEPARD: We had proposed the fairness hearing
for August 1st, Your Honor.
                     August 1st. Okay.
         THE COURT:
                                         Thank you.
         MR. SHEPARD: Thank you, Your Honor.
                     All right. Very good. Thank you.
         THE COURT:
         And Randall Weill?
         MR. WEILL: Yes, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: You've done the reports?
         MR. WEILL: Yes, Your Honor.
         THE COURT:
                    Coordinated it anyway, right?
         MR. WEILL:
                     Coordinated, right. I think everybody
here has contributed immensely to putting those together so
it is a joint effort by all counsel.
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THE COURT:
                           I appreciate it. Thank you very much.
 1
 2
     They are very helpful. Thank you.
 3
               MR. WEILL:
                           Thank you.
               THE COURT: I try to remember all of this but I
 4
     don't. Now I know I have to look at a paper before I say
 5
     anything to make sure I am on the right part and right
 6
 7
     settlement.
                  Okay.
 8
               MR. SHEPARD: Your Honor, if I may, Steve Shepard
 9
     again.
10
               I was prompted by my co-counsel to ask to confirm
11
     if August 1st would work for the Court's calendar so we could
12
     plan on the fairness hearing on that date.
13
               THE COURT: Let me just take a look at that.
14
               MR. SHEPARD: Thank you, Your Honor.
15
               THE COURT: Okay. August 1st is a Wednesday.
     there any possibility -- I don't know the days -- to do it in
16
17
     July -- wait a minute. How's July 26th, or would that not be
18
     enough days -- enough time?
19
               MR. SHEPARD: Let me take a moment and confer with
20
     the other counsel who would like to be present, Your Honor.
21
               THE COURT: Yes.
22
               MS. SALZMAN: Good morning, Your Honor.
23
     Hollis Salzman.
24
               If it is at all possible if we could have a couple
25
     of dates that would work for your schedule and then we can
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check with the notice provider because we just want to make
 1
 2
     sure that the publications and the time for the class members
 3
     to be noticed work with the fairness date.
 4
               THE COURT: Have you already verified that for
 5
     August 1st?
 6
               MS. SALZMAN: We have.
 7
               THE COURT: Let's keep it August 1st.
               MS. SALZMAN:
                             Okay. Thank you.
 8
 9
               THE COURT: We will keep August 1st.
10
               MS. SALZMAN:
                             Thank you, Your Honor.
11
               THE COURT: Okay. Status of scheduling orders.
               MR. REISS: Good morning, Your Honor. Will Reiss
12
     for the end payor plaintiffs.
13
               THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Reiss.
14
15
               MR. REISS: Good morning. So approximately a month
16
     ago end payor plaintiffs, in conjunction with the other
17
     plaintiffs groups, began reaching out to defendants in nine
     separate cases to start the process of scheduling the 26(f)
18
19
     discovery conferences. We also sent each of the non-settling
20
     defendants draft protective orders, a proposed discovery plan
21
     and the various documents that Your Honor has reviewed and
22
     ordered in numerous cases.
23
               Unfortunately, to our frustration, there has been
24
     quite a bit of pushback from the defendants. There has been
25
     a few exceptions. But we are getting pushback that, for
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instance, direct purchaser plaintiffs and some of the other
plaintiffs are in different time frames in terms of when they
filed their cases and some have motions to dismiss that are
pending. And from the perspective of end payor plaintiffs,
and I think automotive dealers are also on the same track as
we are, we very much want to move forward with these cases.
I know Your Honor during the last status conference urged us
to move forward.
                 Typically these documents take months to
negotiate, and we are not even dealing with getting
defendants' documents.
         So, again, we are doing everything in our power.
                                                           Ι
think we have some meet and confers scheduled with some of
these defendants, but if we still continue to get resistance,
we will likely be filing motions to compel to really move
forward with this.
         THE COURT:
                     Well --
         MASTER ESSHAKI: Did I mention I'm slow?
         MR. REISS: Well, we heard, so we wanted to try to
fill your plate again.
         THE COURT: Yeah. You need to move forward on
this, so why don't you do your motions to compel in the next
30 days if you don't get some resolution. All right. I
would rather that they be before the Master and have it set
than to be delayed any longer.
         MR. REISS: Yes, Your Honor. We will do that.
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Thank you.
 1
 2
               THE COURT: Uh-huh.
 3
               MR. SPECTOR: Good morning, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: Good morning.
 4
               MR. SPECTOR: Eugene Spector on behalf of the
 5
     direct payor plaintiffs.
 6
 7
               THE COURT: How are you, Mr. Spector?
 8
               MR. SPECTOR: Fine. Thank you, Your Honor.
                                                            And
 9
     you?
10
               THE COURT: Good.
11
               MR. SPECTOR: In terms of the scheduling orders, we
12
     are working with the end payors and the auto dealers to try
1.3
     to get that done. We have a few cases where we're on our
14
     own, and we are dealing with those where we now are getting
15
     service. We have arbitration issues where we are getting
     pushback on trying to schedule conferences, but we will
16
17
     within the next 30 days get the process fully started with
18
     all of those cases and see where we can move them along.
19
               THE COURT: Okay.
20
               MR. SPECTOR: All right.
21
               THE COURT: Keep that 30 days, so we will need to
22
     push the end of this to get going.
23
               MR. SPECTOR: All right. We will, Your Honor.
24
               THE COURT: I'm getting anxious. We are either
25
     going to settle it or we are going to have a trial and start
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something so we can see where this goes, seriously.
 1
 2
               MR. SPECTOR: Fair enough.
               THE COURT: I'm not kidding you.
 3
               MR. SPECTOR: Thank you, Your Honor.
 4
                          All right.
 5
               THE COURT:
                          Your Honor, last time we were here I
 6
               MR. PARKS:
 7
     spoke about the two cases where we are -- the truck and
 8
     equipment dealers were taking the lead on the scheduling
 9
     orders.
10
               Radiators was one. That's now been resolved.
                                                              That
11
     scheduling order is in place. As I mentioned, we really have
12
     one defendant remaining in that case in any event with active
13
     settlement discussions, but that's in place.
               The other is the starters and alternators matter.
14
15
     We have circulated to the direct purchasers, who we believe
16
     are also in that matter, a draft scheduling order. Once we
17
     have their input, to the extent that they have some on that,
18
     we will get that out, and our intention is to do that within
19
     a week or so and get that out to the two defendants that
20
     remain in that case for us. And there may be other
21
     defendants in that case for the directs, I just don't know
     yet. But we are moving forward with that, and we understand
22
23
     it is a priority for the Court.
24
               THE COURT: Good. That's good. All right.
                                                            The
     next is the date for the status conference. We have a status
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conference filed -- schedule already for June 6th, and I
 1
 2
     think you know about that. And I was thinking the next one
 3
     would be September 26th. September 26th, does anybody --
     does that ring a bell to anybody? Anything else planned?
 4
 5
               MR. BARRETT: Did you say the 25th or 26th?
                          The 26th. Now, what I have to tell you
 6
               THE COURT:
 7
     is we will not be in this courtroom but I don't know where we
 8
     will be. They are doing, as you can see from the hallways,
 9
     re -- it is really the HVAC system in here that's going to be
10
     redone, but the whole floor will be closed off for probably
11
     the next six months. So it will be these two conferences.
12
     Obviously we are well aware we need a courtroom that's
1.3
     larger. If we can't get a courtroom, if we can't, we will be
     down on the first floor. There is a room called the
14
15
     Detroit Room, which is like a big conference room but I think
16
     it would do fine for us, and so we will go down there.
17
     we will notify you in the next agenda. I just would like to
18
     tell you so in case you don't look at the agenda, please look
19
     for where you are going to come because you will not be able
20
     to get on this floor.
               MASTER ESSHAKI: Your Honor, can we just confirm
21
22
     6/5 and 9/25 would be the Master's motion day?
23
               THE COURT:
                           Yes.
24
               MASTER ESSHAKI:
                                Thank you.
25
               THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else?
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MS. CASTILLO: Good morning, Your Honor. Elizabeth
 1
     Castillo for the end payor plaintiffs.
 2
 3
               I believe we skipped over Section 2-C.
               THE COURT: The update on -- yes, we did.
 4
               MS. Castillo: So for the end payor plaintiffs,
 5
     we've received all the DOJ productions from the defendants in
 6
     the later cases, except I would like to point out that two
 7
 8
     defendants, Panasonic and Maruyasu, haven't produced their
 9
     DOJ productions to us. And I followed up with counsel for
10
     these defendants, and they've declined to produce their DOJ
11
     productions to us.
               Panasonic, as you know, did not plead guilty with
12
13
     respect to AC systems, but Panasonic did plead guilty with
     respect to switches, steering angle sensors and HID ballasts.
14
     So we would like the Court to order Panasonic to produce the
15
16
     DOJ docs relating to AC systems to plaintiffs.
17
               And with respect to Maruyasu, Maruyasu hasn't pled
18
     quilty but it has been indicted, its U.S. subsidiary has been
19
     indicted as well, and I believe four executives have been
20
     indicted, so we would like Maruyasu's DOJ production.
               THE COURT: Okay. I think we have a defendant
21
22
     here.
23
               MR. KESSLER: Good morning, Your Honor.
24
     Jeffery Kessler, and I will speak for Panasonic.
25
               First of all, Your Honor, I'm very surprised to
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hear this because on this particular issue we had proposed a meet and confer with the plaintiffs about this, and they have yet to schedule a meet and confer, and it is very unusual to have it presented not only before the meet and confer but it would go to the magistrate if there was a dispute, but instead we find ourselves here in open court discussing this.

Having said that, just so Your Honor understands what the issue is, Your Honor issued an order which was very clear and specific. It said that there were a group of identified cases, including air conditioners, which we are in, and the Court then said the following -- let me just get the correct language, please. This is from page 4 of Your Honor's order. The Court orders all defendants -- this is paragraph 3 -- named in air-conditioning systems and then a variety of other cases that have entered a guilty plea in connection with the products at issue in these cases, the named cases, to produce their DOJ production in those cases.

Panasonic's situation is it has never entered into a guilty plea in any of these cases, including air conditioners. What it has done is it had guilty pleas in other cases for which we have previously produced years ago all of our DOJ productions in those cases.

So we settled switches, we produced all of our production in switches, we did that earlier.

With respect to air conditioners, we informed

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April 23rd.

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plaintiffs we have no quilty plea and therefore there is
nothing for us to produce with respect to air conditioners.
I think we are very clearly in compliance with the Court's
order, but in any event, if they wish to discuss this
further, we should have a meet and confer, and if there is an
issue for the magistrate, it could be presented there, but
there really should be no dispute given the terms of the
Court's order.
         THE COURT: Okay.
         MR. KESSLER:
                       Thank you.
         THE COURT: Let me hear a response. Okay -- oops,
go ahead, another defendant.
         MS. COLE: Good morning, Your Honor. Eileen Cole
with White and Case on behalf of Maruyasu.
         As counsel for the EPPs pointed out, Maruyasu has
not pled guilty, and there has not been, according to the
order -- the order requires Maruyasu and other defendants to
produce the documents that have entered a quilty plea in
connection with the products at issue in the case or for
which there has been an announcement of such a plea agreement
by DOJ. Neither has occurred with respect to Maruyasu.
         The criminal case is currently pending before
Judge Dlott in the Southern District of Ohio, and all of the
deadlines in that case have currently been stayed until
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Your Honor, if and when any such action should occur, we certainly would produce any documents that we have or have -- that we have provided to the division, but, Your Honor, currently the order -- the terms in the order do not apply to Maruyasu, and that's what we advised the EPP.

We are also similarly situated to Panasonic in that there has been no meet and confer with the EPPs, and the EPPs did not identify that this would be brought before Your Honor instead of the magistrate.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I didn't know that either, but we are talking about the order of October 25th, 2017 that the Court entered, and on the top of page 5, after it lists all of the parts, it does say those defendants that have entered a guilty plea in connection with the products at issue or for which there has been announcement of such a plea.

So let's hear your response.

MS. CASTILLO: So this issue previously came up with -- I believe with respect to the Mitsuba and Koito defendants. And we brought the issue up before Special Master Esshaki, and he ruled that Mitsuba and Koito were to produce their DOJ productions to plaintiffs in all cases, not just the ones that they pled guilty to. So this issue has come before the Special Master even if it relates to other defendants, and I don't think Panasonic or Maruyasu here

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should have an excuse not to produce these to plaintiffs.
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 2
               With respect to --
               THE COURT: Wait a minute. Let's stop there.
 3
     Mr. Esshaki?
 4
               MASTER ESSHAKI: Your Honor, I do not recall when I
 5
     made that ruling, whether it preceded or was post your order.
 6
 7
               THE COURT: Okay.
 8
               MS. CASTILLO: It was from November of 2015.
 9
               THE COURT:
                           2016?
10
               MS. CASTILLO: '15.
11
               THE COURT: Oh, '15.
12
               MS. CASTILLO: It was a while ago.
1.3
               MR. KESSLER: Your Honor, there was an order three
14
     years ago involving one defendant in a very specific set of
15
     facts that the Special Master ruled upon. Two years later
16
     Your Honor entered this specifically negotiated order.
17
     was presented to Your Honor by stipulation which specifically
18
     said what was to be produced or not. That is what we are
19
     complying with.
20
               THE COURT: Okay.
21
               MR. KESSLER: We obviously are not looking at a
22
     dispute for another defendant three years ago that has
23
     nothing to do with your subsequent issued order.
24
               THE COURT: Here is what we are going to do. I
25
     want you to do your meet and confer and I want you to do that
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within the next 21 days, okay, so that's three weeks to give you time to do it, and then I want you to file a motion before Mr. Esshaki to resolve this. He can go back and look at what he ordered if he believes it applies, he can look at what the Court ordered a couple years later, and we will get it resolved. I would like to resolve it today but I don't recall that last order -- I mean the order that Mr. Esshaki did, and I think we need to give you an opportunity to meet and confer.

MS. CASTILLO: Okay.

MR. KESSLER: That's exactly the process we thought would be followed, Your Honor. Thank you.

MS. COLE: Your Honor, I just would like to note for the record that my understanding is that the earlier 2015 order dealt with a plaintiff where there was a plea agreement on record or an announcement from the DOJ, and, again, Maruyasu is not in that situation currently.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. REISS: Your Honor, this is Will Reiss again for the end payor plaintiffs.

Just for the record, Maruyasu and I had extensive communications about this, and we even said that since this wasn't resolved, we were going to file a motion to compel. So the idea that we haven't met and spoken and addressed this issue is not correct. But we are happy again to communicate

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if there are additional issues to discuss, but it is our
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 2
     position that we have met and conferred.
 3
               THE COURT:
                           I do want you to meet and confer. As I
     said, I think the three weeks is sufficient time to set up a
 4
     meeting, and after you meet and confer if you can't resolve
 5
     it I would say within a couple weeks, let's say two weeks
 6
 7
     after, that you file a motion, and then Mr. Esshaki will set
 8
     it for a hearing.
 9
               MS. COLE:
                          Thank you, Your Honor.
10
               MR. KESSLER:
                             Thank you, Your Honor.
11
               THE COURT:
                          Okay. Counsel?
12
               MR. WEILL: Your Honor, Randall Weill again. Good
     morning.
13
               On behalf of direct purchasers, this is more of a
14
15
     Greenshade report and request about this order that you
16
     entered. We have looked at the --
17
               THE COURT: We are talking about the October --
                           The October order that you entered.
18
               MR. WEILL:
                                                                Ιt
19
     listed the cases that are in the agenda.
20
               THE COURT:
                          Yes.
               MR. WEILL: We've looked it over and found that
21
22
     there were some cases that the direct purchasers were not
23
     part of at the time that the Court entered the order.
     going through it and trying to figure out the status, what we
24
25
     wanted to do was to ask the Court if it were possible, and
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certainly the defendants could comment, to allow the direct purchasers to be included with respect to the alternators case and the starters case because those I believe were limited to the truck dealer cases.

There are some other cases that are subject to the order that direct purchasers are going to pursue once we've had an opportunity to have service conducted, and we are not asking for -- you know, we are not saying there is a dispute of any kind, but we will pursue that. But we did also note that there are some cases that not are listed in this report that we would ask to be added, and let me identify those, and to the extent I have listed cases for which productions have already been made by guilty plea parties and we received them, I apologize, but let me list them.

For anti-vibration rubber parts, I know that
Bridgestone and Toyo Tire pled guilty. For ignition coils,
Diamond Electric pled guilty. For power window motors,
Mitsuba pled guilty. For switches, Panasonic and Omron plead
guilty. And for valve timing control devices, Aisin Seiki
pled guilty.

And all we are saying is that if it is possible if we could propose an order we would circulate to the defendants that simply supplements what you issued in October so that it includes the direct purchasers and some cases where there are guilty pleas but we don't think there have

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been any productions made. And if defendants indicate no,
 1
 2
     no, we've done this, then that's fine, we can sort that out.
 3
               THE COURT: Why don't you submit a proposed order
     to amend this order to add these defendants, and then the
 4
     defendants can agree, object or whatever, and we will deal
 5
     with that. If they do, then that would go before the Master
 6
 7
     also in the timely fashion as the others.
 8
               MR. WEILL: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
 9
               THE COURT:
                          Thank you for bringing that up.
10
     Anything else on this October order?
11
               (No response.)
               THE COURT: No. All right. Our next item is the
12
13
     motion hearing. Mr. Esshaki, you are free to stay but you
14
     are also free to leave.
15
               MASTER ESSHAKI: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
16
     It is good it see you.
               MR. WEILL: Your Honor, could we have a couple
17
     minutes to set up and also to talk to defense counsel for a
18
19
     moment?
                         Yeah. We can take a five-minute break.
20
               THE COURT:
21
               MR. WEILL:
                           Thank you.
22
                           We will just resume in five minutes.
               THE COURT:
23
               THE LAW CLERK: All rise. Court is in recess.
24
               (Court recessed at 10:37 a.m.)
25
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(Court reconvened at 10:45 a.m.; Court and Counsel
 1
 2
               present.)
 3
               THE LAW CLERK: All rise. Court is again in
     session. You may be seated.
 4
               THE COURT: Okay. This is the direct purchaser
 5
     plaintiffs' motion to exclude portions of the expert report
 6
     and opinions of Mr. McCloskey.
 7
 8
               MR. WEILL: Randall Weill, this time arguing on
 9
     behalf of direct purchaser plaintiffs.
10
               If I may approach the bench, I have a copy of a
     couple -- of a single PowerPoint.
11
12
               THE COURT: All right.
13
               MR. WEILL: Sometimes PowerPoints aren't as legible
14
     or responsive as I would hope.
15
               THE COURT:
                           I had indicated to -- somebody had
16
     asked me if anybody wanted to leave if you are not involved
17
     in the motions, and you can feel free to leave or stay.
18
     Okay.
19
               Mr. Weill.
20
               MR. WEILL: First, thank you very much, Your Honor,
21
     for hearing argument on this motion. I think it is -- it
22
     presents some important issues and I look forward for the
23
     opportunity to explain what our views are with respect to
24
     Mr. McCloskey's testimony.
25
               Nate, could you put up the second slide, please.
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So if we go to page 2 of the handout, Your Honor, it is a recitation from Scrap Metals of the Daubert framework and legal standard that I know the Court is very familiar with this. I just put this up here to start to talk about Mr. McCloskey's experience, and so sort of set that in the framework of what we are talking about.

I think as the Court is aware, when we talk about his qualifications, it -- the Scrap Metals court says it

So we know Mr. McCloskey spent his career in the industrial distribution field. His employers have been involved in industrial distribution extensively. When he left his most recent employer, Command Industries, he started a consulting business, and he self-describes his consulting expertise as in the, quote, industrial distribution space, closed quote.

requires knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.

So that's I think important when we talk about automotive bearings and his opinions about automotive bearings. He doesn't say he's consulting or offering his expertise with respect to automotive bearings. For that matter, he doesn't say he's offering his expertise with respect to the manufacture of bearings.

I would also note that Mr. McCloskey in his declaration appended what I think is a pamphlet in attachment 4 from the Bearing Specialists Association that

describes a program that the Bearing Specialists Association sponsors through I believe Southern Illinois University for individuals to become verified bearing specialists.

Again, Mr. McCloskey indicates he's not a certified bearings specialist, and so that I think informs us of -- at least from our perspective, it informs the nature of his testimony.

Finally, Mr. McCloskey has never testified as an expert before so we don't have a track record of his being qualified as an expert in a court proceeding or to look at what his expertise was deemed as qualifying for purposes of testimony. So that piece is missing as well.

So I would like to move on then to the automotive bearing piece of our argument, which, as the Court knows, is the -- what we feel is the very significant issue for us. If I could start with putting a little perspective on the automotive bearing field.

If you could go to the next slide, you will see page 3 is the first page of the deposition testimony of a Dina Gehlke [sic] at McGuire Bearings.

And could you go to the next page, please.

And this McGuire Bearings, as the Court knows, is one of the class representatives in the case, and at her deposition she testified, if you go to page 4, can you tell me the types of bearings that McGuire sells?

And she responded, we sell ball bearings, we sell roller bearings, automotive bearings, mounted bearings, and continues as to the type of bearings they sell.

On the next page she said -- the question is, you mentioned automotive bearings. What are you referring to when you say automotive bearings?

Bearings used in autos.

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And then down lower in the page, when I say automotive bearings, a lot of manufacturers designate those bearings in their catalogues as automotive bearings.

You go to the next slide, the first page of the deposition of Mr. Steven McGuire at McGuire Bearings. If you go to page 70, the next page there, you will see on page 71 he responds to similar questions as to the types of bearings that are sold by McGuire, which include many different kinds: tapered roller bearings, ball bearings, also auto bearings. And he continues to say you can't look at a bearing and say, oh, this is an automotive bearing or this is an industrial bearing because most bearings that are used in automobiles are also used in other things.

And then he goes on in the next page, on page 8, to say in response to a question about dimensions, he says it is very -- let me read the question. And would the size and dimensions of the tapered roller bearing used for the automobile be the same size and dimensions for the one used

for the speed reducer?

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Yes, it very much could because these are our standard parts where the standards have been set for a long time, and multiple manufacturers manufacture the part and normally there are just a lot of crossover between the two.

So in that context we obviously have a distributor who sells industrial bearings but also automotive bearings. We know that the defendants sell all types of bearings, industrial bearings and automotive bearings. In fact, although there's some reference to the uniqueness of customized bearings insofar as they relate to automobiles, if you can turn the page, you will see here, this is one of the exhibits from Mr. McCloskey's deposition, number 4256, this is a little ad from SKF, one of the defendants, that is obviously geared toward the replacement aspect of wheel hub bearings. Wheel hub bearings are for automobiles. They are a customized bearing for automotive use, but they aren't unique bearings because they are -- they are available, readily available.

And obviously if -- I have a 2007 Ford 500, great car, but if I need a wheel bearing, I don't need to go to Ford to get it. I can get that wheel bearing, and SKF says here on page 10, touting its expertise, our premium quality hub bearings are manufactured using high-quality steel and surface finishes, premiums seals, OE sensors, precision

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manufacturing techniques, precise assembly balances. Every SKF premium hub is 100 percent tested to the actual OE specifications per part number for fit, form and function, and that means it will fit correctly and work correctly and last as long as the original hub that came with the car when it was new.

So clearly industrial and automotive bearings share a supply chain commonality from both the defendants and the distributors. In fact, Mr. McCloskey indirectly confirms that because in his testimony he talks about his expertise because he served on a distributors' advisory council that was put together by NTN. It turns out this was a distributors' advisory council for industrial bearings. We will get to that in a minute.

It turns out Mr. McCloskey says, well, there also was an NTN distributor advisory council for automotive bearings. I didn't serve on that council but Command, his employer, was a participant with NTN, and it just reinforces this commonality of these bearings and their availability.

So turning to Mr. McCloskey. As we have mentioned in our submissions, Mr. McCloskey has no training in the sale of auto bearings, he never sold an auto bearing, he never responded to an RFQ for an automotive bearing.

Interestingly, he was aware of such an RFQ coming to him from an automobile source manufacturer, apparently to Command, an

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industrial distributor, for bearings. It turned out that it didn't go anywhere because they felt they couldn't respond adequately, but the idea -- that idea that automotive manufacturers will send an RFQ to an industrial distributor speaks, in our view, volumes about the nature of bearings and their uses, and they can be standardized bearings, they can be customized bearings, but they can be had from all sources, including distributors and certainly from all of the defendants.

Now, we get to the bottom of Mr. McCloskey's expertise I think with his testimony that says -- if we could go to page 12 which is an excerpt from his testimony where he says in response to a question -- the question: So the extent of your knowledge is that automotive OEMs use RFQs; is that correct? He says yes.

So we feel that Mr. McCloskey -- Mr. McCloskey's experience is non-existent with respect to automotive bearings, and that's the reason that we requested that those portions of his declaration that relate to opinions about automotive bearings should not be permitted to -- should not be admitted because they simply aren't reliable because they are not based on knowledge or experience.

Turning to manufacturing, Mr. McCloskey's declaration contains numerous references to manufacturing and the implications of manufacturing and what appears to -- he

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appears to state the -- are the differences or the difficulties manufacturing different types of bearings, yet Mr. McCloskey was never involved in the manufacture of bearings. His knowledge on manufacturing appears to be based solely on visits to NTN plants, most recent some five years It's clear he has no access, had no access to any internal financials of the manufacturers, so he has no knowledge of how those -- what those costs are. For example, he doesn't know how they are allocated so he doesn't know anything about how you amortize or price or allocate costs for materials or tooling or labor or the treatments for bearings or inventory compliance. He simply doesn't have that kind of background to offer those kinds of opinions. With respect to markets, this is more specified in terms of our concerns. There are a couple of instances where, first of all, Mr. McCloskey's experience appears to be more generalized in nature, but, for example, when he talks about Timken, he offers no basis for an opinion about the majority of bearings that Timken sold are X, but he never worked with Timken. He may have knowledge about what Command purchased from Timken, but that doesn't speak to what Timken's experience is. So we don't feel that -- and he didn't look at any Timken data. So that very narrow perspective on what Command's experience with Timken is we don't think serves as an adequate support for a broad

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statement about what Timken, the nature of Timken's business is.

Similarly, with respect to Chinese imports, he was asked but gave no support or sources for his statements about the percentages of bearings that were imported from China over this time period. Most significantly, he offers no opinions or knowledge about what kind of bearings they were. Were they high-quality bearings, which the defendants certainly specialize in? I -- and this is perhaps not the best analogy, but I can think of needing a tool for some purpose at my home, and depending on what it is, if I want something cheap just to get the job done once, I might go to Harbor Freight and I will get something that is made in China and it is okay. But if I want something to work on my automobile, I would go to Sears and I would get a Craftsman tool to do it because I know that's going to be reliable.

So there is a big distinction in terms of quality in that respect that I think that analogy suggests is important as well with respect to any discussions about bearings that are imported from China. Where Mr. McCloskey cannot even tell us where he got this information, we would ask that that data be stricken from his declaration.

Next, with respect to substitutions, this -- these opinions in Mr. McCloskey's declaration appear to be used to support a proposition by defendants that there has to be some

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kind of Precambrian bearing that's used as a benchmark for all other bearings, and that if you have a notion of what the price is for this Proto bearing, then that's the only way you can tell an impact of price fixing on all other bearings.

That's not the direct purchasers' position and far from it.

We believe firmly that there are many types of bearings. As Mr. Kessler said at the class certification hearing, they can be as small as a grain of rice, they could be in a wristwatch, or they could be in a windmill or I think his example was a Ferris wheel. But those have to -- those issues have to deal with the different sizes that are used for a particular function, and that does not have anything to say about what types of bearings are available from whom for any particular source, and that goes to the heart of whether a defendant or any of the defendants can make that bearing for the Ferris wheel or the bearing for the wristwatch. And that's where the substitutions come down to the question of are bearings -- is it possible to substitute bearings.

Now, Mr. McCloskey, if we go to page 14, this is Mr. McCloskey's declaration, at paragraph 13, he says in the highlighted portion, for the majority of applications, however, bearings simply are not interchangable, meaning that a buyer is unable to substitute one bearing for another without the possibility of undesired changes in performances and liability exposure.

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Well, we have already seen as example the SKF brochure with the little child in a baby seat saying we can make a customized hub bearing that's going to protect your child just the same as that original OEM part.

We believe Mr. -- in particular, that paragraph 13 statement by Mr. McCloskey is not reliable for a number of reasons, including what we already described as his lack of knowledge of manufacturing, so he can't really speak to the capability of the defendants to produce a particular bearing for a particular use. He, as mentioned, is not familiar with the term form, fit or function, was not apparently. But it is certainly used as a way to describe how bearings can be used in different places. He's never, as he testified, worked with customers to decide an appropriate substitute bearing, and as I mentioned at the beginning, he's not a certified bearing specialist.

And I mentioned that attachment 4. If you go to page 15 of the handout, we will look at attachment or appendix 4 to Mr. McCloskey's declaration, and this is the brochure I mentioned. And if we look on the first page, it says in the highlighted portion the program is designed to certify industry personnel as bearing specialists, individuals with excellent knowledge in the selection, application and analysis of bearings.

If you go to the next page, it has a description of

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the skill sets that are performed by bearing specialists, among them in the highlighting, of course, is the recommending interchanges and substitutions, identifying bearing type, application source, and manufacture, verifying bearing dimensions, match part numbers, justifying change to alternate bearings based on availability, service life and cost.

So I'm not saying that Mr. McCloskey has to be a bearing certified -- a certified bearing specialist to testify about bearings if he has the appropriate experience, which he doesn't have. But it is clear that someone who has knowledge of bearings and is certified as such is well versed in the adaptability of bearings for different uses and the substitution of those bearings and the interchangeability of those bearings. And this is something that Mr. McCloskey provided in connection -- in support of his declaration.

Next, Mr. McCloskey has a statement in his declaration, if we could go to page 18, that I found rather remarkable in that it is -- it's easy to overlook, but it says that in this report the term performance will refer to a bearing's ability to meet or exceed a buyer's expectation of acceptable operating life.

Now, if this is the standard for someone who is familiar with the bearings -- the substitution of bearings, there is no expertise involved because the customer is the

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expert, not the bearings specialist, certainly not the certified bearings specialist. This definition, in our view, is not -- it's not a methodology, it's not scientific, it's not reliable because it simply says I will give the customer whatever he wants, and if it doesn't work, it's not my problem. He's not offering any expertise in that conclusion -- in that definition.

And I will point out that that definition of performance, although it appears in paragraph 19 and other paragraphs, and I will name the paragraphs, 13, 27 and 33 through 36, you'll find that the term performance is used but in its regular sense, not in the sense of what a customer thinks about it but how it actually performs in usage to determine whether a particular bearing is appropriate for that particular use.

So we feel that that odd definition of performance, in abnegation of any expertise in that respect, is, in conjunction with his inexperience in actually working through substitutions, a very telling aspect of his testimony that suggests he should not be able to talk about substitutions or to say that the vast majority of applications are not interchangable.

In fact, and this is the part I find most interesting, if we look at the references Mr. McCloskey cites in the I think appendix 2 of his declaration, he's got a list

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of citations. He was asked what are these documents, and he says these are reliable documents from manufacturers, and I rely on -- I would rely on these documents, these are reliable documents.

So I looked through these documents, and if we start -- because you don't get a sense of them, let me pull them to show you what we are talking about here.

So if we could start with page 19. So page 19 is the first page of a document that's call SKF Bearings Master Interchange. And if we turn to the second page, you will see there on page 20 a little statement that says this catalogue is presented in a simple to use sequence similar to a dictionary listing. So it is — to me it is like a telephone book. If I know a particular bearing, and they have a list of abbreviations at the beginning that show that some 400 types of bearings that are listed here so I can go to that particular bearing, a Koyo bearing, and then I go next to the Koyo bearing and there is the SKF equivalent.

So this is one example of how the defendants spend considerable resources explaining how their bearings can be used to replace other bearings -- other manufacturers' bearings. In fact, at the bottom of page 20 -- on the bottom of page 20 it says, note, interchanges listed here will provide a fast conversion of manufacturer or competitor numbers to the SKF equivalent.

So that is pretty much it. The dictionary provides 1 2 a fast conversion. It is a tool that certainly someone 3 familiar with bearings would be able to use. So then we -- I will go to the next reference. 4 This is a little heftier. This is another SKF reference, and 5 this takes a little more time to go through but --6 7 THE COURT: I'm glad you are not submitting those 8 into evidence. 9 MR. WEILL: I thought the Court might appreciate 10 that, but you have to enjoy, you know, this looks official. 11 Anyhow, if we go to page 22, I'm quessing, yes, we 12 will see here an interesting statement that says as far as 1.3 SKF is concerned, experience has shown that the requirements of the vast majority of bearing applications can be met using 14 bearings with these standardized dimensions. 15 16 So here is a document that Mr. McCloskey relies on, 17 and it says pretty specifically something that appears to be 18 directly a contrast of his statement that the vast majority 19 of applications are not interchangable, but that's not all. 20 That's SKF. 21 We move on to NTN, another defendant, page 23, ball 22 and roller bearings, another reference source. 23 If we go to slide 24, we have a statement or a 24 couple of statements that I find very interesting. It talks 25 about the characteristics of rolling bearings, and it says

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rolling bearings come in many shapes and variables, each with its own distinctive feature. However, when compared with sliding bearings, those are like plain bearings that just go on the edge of a shaft and that don't have balls or rollers. Rolling bearings have the following advantages. And I've highlighted item 2 because I thought that most interesting. They are internationally standardized, interchangable and readily obtainable.

Now, that's significant because of what the statement on -- the next highlight statement says at paragraph 1.3.4. It says the boundary dimensions and shapes of bearings conforming to international standards are interchangable and can be easily -- obtained easily and economically over the world over -- over the world over. It is therefore better to design mechanical equipment to use standard bearings.

Now, I thought that was interesting because if we go to slide 25, we have a snapshot of a page from the Command -- a Command website, Command being Mr. McCloskey's employer for some ten years where he was, I believe, a senior vice president, and it says a number of things about his business. But the one I thought most interesting was at the bottom of the page, which is underlined in red, which says, in extract, our core business lies in the supply and application of standard components. So in contrast to the

idea that there are a vast majority of applications that are not interchangable, Mr. McCloskey's own employer prided itself on providing its customers the ability to use bearings, standard bearings in order to ensure that its business — that they could offer value to its customers and reduce their costs.

Now, finally another document that Mr. McCloskey cites is an NSK document, and if we turn to page 26, there you go, there's the cover page. If we turn to page 27 and then 28, I highlighted in the table of contents where the catalogue shows for each of the type of bearings that there are interchanges for those bearings that are provided by NSK. So, for example, ball bearings, and we talk about single road deep grove ball bearings. Well, the interchange is on page B2. For double row angular contact ball bearings, the interchange is on page B24, and so on. It goes into cylindrical roller bearings, spherical roller bearings, tapered roller bearings, as the Court can see.

And then if we go to page 29, and I thought this was perhaps the most interesting part of this catalogue, and it is a flow chart. And if the Court were to look at this — if we start, for example, at the top, it says — my copy is hard to read so I'm going to go to the catalogue here. At the top it says extract failed bearing. Question one, does the bearing have a destination? No. So you go to the right

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and it says, determining the basic bearing type, ball, roller, et cetera. Measure the basics, and then go to NSK and ask for a quote. Obtain the bearing once you have the quote. And then at bottom it says fit new NSK bearing.

Well, if we go back to the top of the flow chart and we ask does the bearing have a designation, you say yes. Does it have an NSK reference? Let's say yes. We go to the left, it says get a quote at. And at the bottom it says the same thing, fit new NSK bearing.

Well, if it doesn't have an NSK reference, you identify the bearing designation. Does the designation have an interchange in this section of the book? If it does, you find it, the bottom result, fit new NSK bearing. If it doesn't have a designation on the interchange, it says consult the NSK -- an NSK authorized distributor, and then you are going to get a quote from NSK and it is going to result in fitting the new NSK bearing.

So, you know, these documents that Mr. McCloskey put together clearly indicate that the statement -- that a vast majority of applications are not interchangable is not a reliable statement.

If we could go to the last page, that brings us to where we feel that the Scrap Metal court tells us that Mr. McCloskey cannot either provide -- that his testimony is based on sufficient facts or data or uses reliable principles

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and methods, and whether -- and it doesn't show he's applied
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     those principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
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     case.
               And for those reasons, Your Honor, we submit that
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     we believe Mr. McCloskey's testimony with respect to the
     topics we have described, not all of the topics in his
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     declaration but with respect to those topics is not
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     admissible, it is not reliable, and therefore should not be
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     permitted.
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               THE COURT: All right.
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                          Thank you very much, Your Honor.
               MR. WEILL:
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               THE COURT:
                          Thank you. Response?
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               MR. PALFIN: Your Honor, Keith Palfin from Winston
     & Straun for the JTEKT defendants, and I will be arguing on
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     behalf all of defendants.
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               We might just need a minute to get the slides set
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     up.
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               Your Honor, I have some hard copies, if I may
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     approach.
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               THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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               MR. PALFIN: If we can go to the first slide.
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     apologies, Your Honor. I think we are having some technical
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     difficulties.
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               Your Honor, the experience that Mr. McCloskey has
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     accumulated in his 40 years in the bearings industry renders
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him well qualified to testify on all of the topics in his report, and that is especially the case because his testimony, his report consists of basic industry facts, and those facts are corroborated by the record in this action as I will show in subsequent slides.

And the courts are crystal clear, particularly in the Sixth Circuit, that where you have an expert who has relevant expertise that challenges like plaintiffs to the breadth of that expertise go to the weight the factfinder gives to his testimony, not to its admissibility.

So if we go to the next slide. And so here is the basic standard for measuring expert testimony: it has to be relevant and reliable. I think that's undisputed so I am just going to go to the next slide.

So the question here, because they are challenging his qualifications and they are solely challenging therefore the reliability of his testimony, the question is how do you assess the reliability of a non-scientific expert testimony that reflects a person from the industry sort of laying out basic facts about the industry? And courts have held that under those circumstances the reliability inquiry doesn't focus on some of the more technical scientific Daubert elements such as, you know, applying principles and methods to facts, but you focus on the expert's knowledge or experience. It is very simple, very direct, you know, does

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he have a basis in his background for providing this testimony?

And in the quote on the bottom of that slide you have the Sixth Circuit finding that the testimony from an expert in the banking industry was reliable based on the expert's practical experiences with 40 years in that industry.

And that — that First Tennessee Bank case, the Sixth Circuit case we are quoting there, is a useful case here because it involved a very similar argument to the ones that plaintiffs are making. The opposing party in this case argued that this banking industry expert, who has spent 40 years in the banking industry, did not have sufficient experience with a particular aspect of the banking industry that was relevant to the case. And what the court held, and you can see this on the next slide, the Sixth Circuit held that the extent that this banking expert may have lacked familiarity with some aspects of the industry, the district court correctly reasoned that such unfamiliarity merely affect the weight and credibility of his testimony, not its admissibility. And we think that principle should be applied here and should result in denial of plaintiffs' motion.

So if we go to the next slide. So I think the appropriate starting point in assessing Mr. McCloskey's testimony is to look very specifically at what testimony is

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being challenged. Here you have -- on the left you have a list of the topics that plaintiffs identified in their brief that they were challenging, and on the right you have topics that they are not challenging.

And I think there are two key takeaways from this slide. The first is that Mr. McCloskey is an undisputed expert on many facets of the bearing industry. Many topics addressed in his report plaintiffs don't challenge his qualifications to testify to those matters.

And I think the second takeaway is that the categories -- so those are on the left, those are just taken straight from plaintiffs' briefs -- that those categories aren't really entirely accurate with respect to the testimony that is being challenged. So, for example, in the briefs they say they are challenging his testimony on bearings markets, but if you actually look at specifically what they are challenging, they don't challenge his qualifications to testify with respect to the industrial OEM bearings market, they don't challenge his qualifications to testify with respect to the industrial aftermarket for bearings, you know, which would fall under the categories of bearing market.

So to understand, you know, what testimony is at issue, you have to look at the exhibit to their motion, and that's -- we will take a look at the excerpt. This is an excerpt of the exhibit to plaintiffs' motion where they

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identify specifically the testimony that they are challenging, and they do that by crossing out the language that they are asking this Court to strike from -- from Mr. McCloskey's report. And this excerpt I think again illustrates the breadth of Mr. McCloskey's -- undisputed breadth of his experience. Plaintiffs don't dispute that he's qualified to testify about bearings fundamentals, the characteristics, designs, applications, customers, sales in the U.S., procurement, pricing or inventory management, but they challenge in this paragraph his ability to testify to manufacturing competitors and markets.

And I think the Sixth Circuit cases we have cited before, you know, when you are here, when you are at this point, when your undisputed expert on so many facets of the industry and you are challenging his qualifications with respect to a few areas, that goes to weight, not admissibility. Your Honor is perfectly capable of taking their arguments, which they went on at length about, you know, why his testimony is wrong and the nature of his qualifications in various areas and applying the appropriate weight to his testimony. And that's what the Sixth Circuit says is the right result with this sort of challenge.

So if we go to the next slide. So this is another excerpt from the exhibit to the motion where they are identifying what they are challenging. And here again, you

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know, undisputed expert in industrial markets, on the industrial aftermarket, but they challenge his ability to testify about the automotive market and the automotive aftermarket.

Now, I think it bears noting that the notion that this person who spent 40 years, you know, in this industry to the point where he's an undisputed expert in the industrial and industrial aftermarket, but plaintiffs say he's not -- he can't testify to the basic facts he has in his report on the automotive, automotive aftermarket, you know, an essential premise of that argument is that the different markets for bearings have highly differentiated features. And with respect to that aspect of plaintiffs' argument, they are right, the markets are highly differentiated. They are -the purchasers buy bearings in different ways, they buy different bearings. They, you know, for example, in the automotive OEMs, will generally purchase customized bearings through a heavily negotiated RFQ process, whereas industrial aftermarket distributors will purchase standard catalogue bearings off of price lists typically with no negotiations. So there's very different purchasing behavior results in very different pricing and have very different, just very different market dynamics in the different markets, in the different bearings markets.

And, you know, the impact of that is, you know,

these differences in the markets require, as we explained last time, and I'm not going to go on -- I'm not going to repeat myself, repeat what we discussed last time too much, but really the differences require individualized inquiries to assess any impact from the alleged conspiracy here, and that, you know, the market differences, which, you know, are an essential premise of plaintiffs' argument here really show that the one-size-fits-all single aggregate overcharge approach that plaintiffs have offered for showing impact here just doesn't fit, it is not a reliable way of showing common impact, especially given the failure of Dr. McClave to account for those very important meaningful differences between the markets.

So the question then, coming back to the present motion, given the markets are so very different, automotive and industrial, how can Mr. McCloskey testify about the automotive market when he spent his career -- he spent his career in the industrial aftermarket, and the answer to that question is two-fold. First, his testimony consists of basic industry facts about the automotive markets, about -- everything in his report is -- just puts in one place just the basic contours of the bearings industry. And a person who spends -- a businessman who spends 40 years of his life in the industrial aftermarket will naturally learn the basic features of related bearings markets. That's exactly what

happened here. When we get to Mr. McCloskey's experience, we will show he has the experience to -- the background to testify reliably on those subjects.

So here are some examples of the challenged testimony. So he testifies that automotive industrial bearing markets are distinct. He testifies that automotive OEMs are large companies, that the OEMs use RFQs and multi-year contracts, and that's different from how bearings are purchased in the industrial aftermarket. That automotive distributors purchase catalogue bearings at list prices. So these are just examples, but if you look at his report, it is all basic industry facts. You wouldn't need the 40 years of experience that he has to testify reliably on those subjects.

And further, all of those facts are corroborated by the record. So, you know, we have on the right just examples from the record that support each those principles, and you could do the same thing for his entire report. It is basic industry facts corroborated by the record. Mr. McCloskey, the purpose of his report is to just put basic facts about the industry in one place, you know, in one organized place, as opposed to those facts being scattered throughout the record, but he doesn't bring anything sort of new or different or something that is not established already by the record the case, so it is, you know, basic facts corroborated by the record.

Let's go to the next slide.

In particular, his testimony about interchangeability. Now, Mr. Weill relied on a number of documents, well, to -- you know, to challenge Mr. McCloskey's testimony regarding interchangeability. Mr. McCloskey's testimony, the thrust of his testimony is that bearings are not interchangable generally, and that is corroborated, first of all, by plaintiffs' own industry expert. They submitted an expert from John Farmer. He testified at a deposition, and he testified and he agreed with the proposition that different types of bearings are generally not interchangable. So there's no meaningful dispute between Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Farmer, plaintiffs' expert, on this issue.

Now, the interchange guides and the other documents that Mr. Weill brought to the Court's attention do not establish otherwise, and I will give you a few examples. So Mr. Weill quoted this SKF product guide, and he had the first two pages and then the third page was omitted. And he used the first two pages to try to show that, you know, bearings are just — a bearing is a bearing, you can just interchange it at will. And the third page shows that's not the case, and the third page corroborates further Mr. McCloskey's testimony that you have to take into account performance characteristics. Even if you have two bearings that are dimensionally identical, you to take into account performance

characteristics.

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So this guide that Mr. Weill relied on, the next page that was not in his presentation, has a Q and A section. For example, it says, question: Why are value grade hub units a risky choice? Answer: Many manufacturers sell replacement hub bearings that are very low priced. Initially you may think that's a great deal or value. Unfortunately, with that low price you get a low quality hub bearing that is inferior to a premium original equipment quality hub bearing.

And then the document continues on to identify the potential problems with putting in, again, a dimensionally identical bearing that has very different performance characteristics. It says those value grade hub units can last less than half as long as a premium unit. Their cheaply made seals can allow moisture and contaminants to enter and destroy the bearing prematurely. They can produce annoying wheel vibration and noise. They can cause your anti-lock braking systems to malfunction. So all sorts of reasons why you need to assess the performance of a bearing, even if it is dimensionally identical, to determine if it is a suitable substitute. And that's the basic thrust of Mr. McCloskey's testimony.

And with the interchange -- and to address the interchange guides, those phonebooks that Mr. Weill's referenced, those guides show -- you know, they are

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phonebooks, and what they do is they identify bearings that are dimensionally identical or similar to each other that could potentially be replacements. But what those -- what those guides tell you is not that bearings are generally interchangeable. They reinforce the conclusion, which is the basis for our class certification arguments in this case, that they are not because those phonebooks will list one bearing and it will list maybe one, two, three others that are dimensionally identical and potential substitutes. rest of the phonebook are bearings that are not substitutes. So any one of these phonebooks will list thousands and thousands of bearings, and for any one there might be one or two, three substitutes. Most are not. And that is the point. It is the diversity, it is the variety of bearings. It is -- and again, the lack of interchangeability also established by plaintiffs' expert when he says bearings of different sizes cannot be substituted for each other, and I think the picture establishes that as well. And you know, again, there -plaintiffs' expert, bearings have numerous different

And also by the way, almost all of those guides contain, you know, some equivalent of a warning saying to the effect of, you know, you can't just throw in a dimension

characteristics, that's what those interchange guides are

telling you, numerous different characteristics.

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identical bearing that we are saying is a potential substitute. You have got to be careful and look at your application, you've got to look at performance issues.

So, for example, on slide 24 of Mr. Weill's presentation below the highlighted part that he had read, it says, however, depending on the type of machine they are to be used in and the expected application and function, a nonstandard or specially designed bearing may be best to use. And so that's just one example. I have seen these warnings in various different ways in these interchange guides.

But it really sort of takes away from the main point that there is just massive diversity, massive variety of bearings with tons of different characteristics, and just more examples here, all from plaintiffs' expert, plaintiffs' industry expert, and just further sort of supports and corroborates Mr. McCloskey's testimony. Different bearings to handle -- there are different bearings that handle different magnitudes of load. There are different bearings to handle different directions of load. There are different bearings that tolerate different speeds. There are different bearings to deal with different types of contaminations. All sorts of different bearings with different functions and characteristics that you have to take into account whenever you're determining an appropriate bearing for an application. And it just further establishes different bearings for

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different purposes. They are not broadly interchangable as the interchange guides show.

So -- so that takes us to -- so the question then is in light of the very sort of basic nature of his testimony, he's just outlining the basic contours of the industry, providing basic facts about the industry, does he have the experience to give reliable testimony about that, about -- you know, that is in his report? The answer is yes.

So, first of all, Mr. McCloskey has worked in the bearings industry for over 40 years, held positions from customer service all the way up to senior management. He was on a board of directors level and everything in between. He's involved with training on bearings, he's been trained on bearings, he's given training on bearings. He's -- and he has had to -- let's go to the next slide. For example, he spent 30 years at Dodge Newark, an industrial aftermarket distributor. He managed bearing customer contracts and training, supervised product development, was involved in all aspects of the business from engineering to sales, hired and trained sales staff.

Let's go to the next one.

And all of these are sort of just summary, high-level bullets. If you look at his CV, it provides even more detail, sort of further establishing that he has the experience that is necessary to testify reliably in this

case.

So he was also spent -- he also spent ten years at Command, which is another industrial aftermarket distributor. He hired, trained and supervised sales staff. He helped develop Command's first private brand bearings offering and was involved in all aspects of that from design and selection, evaluating manufacturing facilities. So this notion that he had -- you know, that he had one tour -- that NTN gave him a tour and that's his sole basis for knowing anything about manufacturing is just not supported by the record.

He evaluated pricing strategies, performance metrics.

Next slide.

And he was also on a number of advisory councils that -- for bearing manufacturers. So various bearing manufacturers, including NTN, you know, have these advisory councils where they invite their customers to discuss issues of relevance to the industry, and he was a part of those councils and supported employees on other councils, other manufacturers' councils. And as part of those councils he would exchange ideas about market dynamics, he would learn bearing suppliers' views on manufacturing and on tradeoffs between the automotive industrial markets. He -- and he did tour manufacturing facilities, and that's another way which

he learned sort of how bearings are manufactured.

Again, not -- not -- you know, if he was putting in his report sort of chemical formulas for the composition of steel and bearings, you know, I could see an argument he -- he -- you know, his background wouldn't suggest that he would be able to opine on that subject, but that's not what he does. He provides very basic information about the manufacturing of bearings, you know, such as, you know, there are manufacturers in dedicated lines, that changing that line involves varying costs. Those are the type of high-level basic facts that are set forth in his report, and those are the types of facts you would expect someone with 40 years in the industry to know.

And let's go to the next slide.

So his experience also embraces each of the four challenged subjects. So, you know, as we discussed, it is interchangeability, manufacturing, markets and automotive. So we just sort of compiled a list of bullets identifying his various experience. These all come from our briefs in our opposition where you can find the cites thereto. But, you know, 40 years in the industry, training, responsible for bearings customer accounts, on advisory councils, you know, observing manufacturing processes, studied processes and compositions in connection with sales pitches, you know, monitored market developments, coordinated with suppliers and

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market strategy. He studied -- and he studied -- he testified he studied automotive bearings, you know, the market for automotive bearings to inform strategies in his market, the industrial market. And he did on occasion assess supply inquiries from automotive customers. This was very You know, I'm not trying to exaggerate his experience This was very rare, but he did have a few over his here. 40 years, a few supply inquiries from customers, including an automotive OEM RFQ. And again, not to exaggerate his experience because that happened once. In his 40 years he received one automotive OEM RFQ. And what he testified happened with that is he was part of the team that analyzed that RFO and ultimately determined that his company could not -- could not fulfill that demand, and so they ended up not responding to it. But he has experience in all facets of the industry.

If we go to the next slide.

And so the Sixth Circuit has ruled that the basic test, non-scientific expert testimony, and we talked before about how it focuses on just experience and knowledge, you know, where the expert has adequately explained how their experience leads to the conclusion, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts, it is reliable. And Mr. McCloskey's report satisfies this standard. His CV, his

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deposition testimony identifies his experience, and his report shows how he's applying it.

Their challenge should be rejected for the same reason that a similar challenge was rejected in First Tennessee that it goes -- you know, that their challenge goes to the weight to be given to his testimony and not his admissibility.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.

MR. KESSLER: Your Honor, just one minute before we turn it over to plaintiffs.

So I listened to the presentation, and it struck me that much of the presentation of plaintiffs was actually not in support of excluding Dr. McCloskey because their McCloskey argument is that he's an industrial guy, he's not an automotive guy. That's essentially their argument.

Instead, they spent the good part of their argument saying, well, it is all interchangable together; automotive, industrial, they all fit together. We spent six and a half hours, Your Honor will recall, on that subject. I'm not asking for any time to reargue that, but I think that subject is well presented to Your Honor.

And if you look at one slide here, 14, a picture is worth a thousand words. So the sole point is that Dr. McClave, who we challenge that point, treats that bearing that has hundreds of people inside of it the same way as this

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bearing that fits on the point of your finger and makes no
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     adjustment in his regression to account for any of that.
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     That was six and a half hours.
               I'm not going to do it again, Your Honor, but I
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     would urge you when you get to that point not be distracted
     by today's argument, which is supposed to be about
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     Dr. McCloskey, and I'm sure you will go back and spend a lot
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 8
     of time looking at what both sides presented in those issues.
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               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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               MR. KESSLER:
                             Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Reply?
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               MR. PALFIN: So there was an amended errata to
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     Mr. McCloskey's deposition testimony and I don't believe it
     made it to the Court's record, but we can discuss with
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     plaintiffs how best to put that on the record.
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               THE COURT: Submit it.
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               MR. PALFIN:
                            I don't think it has an impact on
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     anything we have been discussing.
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               MR. WEILL:
                           Thank you, Keith. I have copies of the
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     amended errata by Mr. McCloskey.
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               THE COURT: All right.
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               MR. WEILL: And the reason it has some
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     significance -- I'm sorry. The reason that the direct
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     purchasers believe it has some significance is because
     footnote 12 of the defendants' opposition to the motion to
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strike portions of Mr. McCloskey's testimony contain references to the original errata that are incorrect.

Briefly, Your Honor, defendants make several comments that I would like to respond to. Specifically, for example, with respect to the page 8 of their presentation, they list among the unchallenged topics bearings pricing. In fact, that the plaintiffs do challenge Mr. McCloskey's ability to discuss bearings pricing insofar as it relates to manufacturing because he doesn't have that information that would enable him to tell us what pricing results from what costs.

With respect to the notion -- let me address this first, this notion here on page 14 of the defendants' presentation. There is this idea the defendants present that the direct purchasers are claiming that every bearing of every type and every size is completely interchangable with every other bearing, and that doesn't make any sense and we are not arguing that.

In fact, the references to Mr. Farmer's testimony I think demonstrate that. For example, on page 13 of the defendants' presentation, they cite that -- Mr. Farmer's testimony to the effect that different types of bearings are not inter -- are generally not interchangable. That's true because we are talking -- as page 13 shows in the picture, we are talking about different types of bearings, a type being a

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roller bearing versus a ball bearing or tapered roller
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               They are not interchangable, Your Honor. That is
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     certainly something that we understand and have not presented
     as any kind of defensible position. We are talking about
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     bearings and the capability of defendants to make those
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     bearings.
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               And the same goes with respect to not only the type
 8
     of bearing but the size of bearing, bearings. That picture
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     on page 14 that Mr. Kessler is fond of, talking about a small
     bearing versus a very large bearing, that's a different size
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11
     bearing. And I will take a small bearing -- I will take the
     large bearing, and the question is can the defendants make
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     that large bearing and sell it, and can they price fix that
     bearing, and how does that impact the price of that bearing?
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     And so that comes within the rubric, the simplified rubric of
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     form, tapered versus roller versus needle, so on, fit, size.
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               THE COURT: So this whole argument of whether they
     are interchangable is --
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19
               MR. WEILL: It only bears --
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               THE COURT: -- it doesn't really have relevance
21
     here.
               MR. WEILL: Well, it is --
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                           This big bearing isn't interchangeable
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               THE COURT:
24
     with the small bearing?
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                           That's absolutely correct, Your Honor.
               MR. WEILL:
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And what these catalogues tell us is that if you've got a wheel hub bearing for your 2007 Escape, you can't substitute it -- you can't use a roller bearing to substitute it, put it in place; you have to get another wheel hub bearing. Or if you have some other functions, you get the same type of bearing. And the point is that the defendants manufacture those bearings as these catalogues suggest.

In fact, when I got ready to depose Mr. McCloskey, one of the puzzles I couldn't understand was his -- as I mentioned, his statement, you know, this summarizes a lot of what he says, but the vast majority of applications are not interchangable; that's that page 14, paragraph 13. And I am thinking I don't understand why he says that because I'm looking at all of these materials that he says are reliable and I relied on, and they are filled with information that the defendants have put together, spent I'm sure millions of dollars to demonstrate to the world that they can make every kind of bearing that is necessary, they can supply every type of bearing.

So I asked Mr. McCloskey, why do you say the vast majority of applications are not interchangeable and yet you have these documents that say -- and also this performance definition, which is odd, but you have these documents that the defendants and the manufacturers that you represented when you were at Command, they tell you we can interchange

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it. You have this -- this brochure for a bearing specialist that says that's part of their job to figure out what can you do to substitute. And his -- he agreed that, yes, that could happen. And what appears to be the reason for his statement that the vast majority of applications are not interchangeable is because of this notion from the defendants that you can't substitute this tiny bearing here for this big bearing here, but that's not what we are trying to say, Your Honor.

And Mr. McCloskey's testimony -- let me get back to Mr. McCloskey's testimony -- suggests that he doesn't seem to understand that or comprehend that distinction. That if he had this knowledge about bearings that is -- he's given credit for, then he would be able to respond to the fact that there is this entire industry built around the notion that every one of these defendants can supply these bearings. And the fact that these bearings are highly specialized and customized doesn't make any difference, and if you get them through an RFQ or if they have been sold over and over again, you can get them out of catalogue, doesn't make any difference because the defendants are supplying these bearings.

There is this reference to this performance -- this SKF guide, and he said I didn't put in the last page about this thing, and it talks about value bearings. Value

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bearings is the way you describe a cheap bearing. It is the Chinese bearing. People don't want to put a Chinese -- I am not being pejorative about Chinese, you know, as a rule, but the Chinese bearings have had a history of being a lower quality bearing. And that's why they don't compete with the defendants' product because the defendants are at the top of their game with respect to bearings. They have the best bearings in the world, no questions about it.

And the fact that Mr. McCloskey was unaware of this distinction between interchangeability among defendants and the idea that, you know, you can't put a two-inch bearing into a three-inch space, it just doesn't make sense. We suggest it supports the notion that he really doesn't have the background sufficient to make the statements that he does in these — in his declaration.

THE COURT: Do you think he's really saying that they are interchangable when they are different sizes or they are not interchangable? I'm not understanding this whole argument because it makes no sense to me. It seems to me, using your catalogue -- your phonebook example, that you have a bearing that's a particular size or dimension and that could be substituted for another, but you have to consider other things, the force on it, et cetera. Why would he not have been talking about that when he's talking about that most are not interchangable? I mean --

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I can only chalk it down to being he
               MR. WEILL:
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     doesn't know, he doesn't know. He says these things and
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     yet --
               THE COURT: Or is he coming at it from a different
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             Is he coming at it --
     angle?
               MR. WEILL: He doesn't seem to have the basic
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     understanding about this notion of how you can substitute
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     these bearings.
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               THE COURT: I mean, how can somebody work for
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     40 years in the bearing industry and think you can change a
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     humongous bearing for a little bearing? I mean, a common
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     person would know that.
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               MR. WEILL: That's the point we are trying to make,
     Your Honor, that we don't think Mr. McCloskey has the
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     background sufficient for him to present evidence that's
     reliable.
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               THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.
               MR. WEILL: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: All right. The Court will give you an
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     opinion.
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               I want to go to -- before I hear the next motion
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     because it might affect those of you who want to stay or
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             We have 6-A, the Bosal motion. I don't know what's
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     going on because we have looked and we have nothing from
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     direct purchasers.
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MR. HANSEL: Understood, Your Honor.
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                           I mean, you're not opposing it?
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               THE COURT:
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               MR. HANSEL: We are. We have conferred with
     counsel for Bosal, and at this time I would like to make a
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     motion that direct purchasers be permitted to file their
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     opposition to the motion to dismiss two weeks from today, and
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     I have discussed it with counsel for Bosal who is present
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 8
     here and I understand they do not object to that.
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               THE COURT:
                           Bosal?
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               MR. MOUW:
                          Your Honor, we filed --
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               THE COURT: What's your name?
               MR. MOUW: Gary Mouw, M-O-U-W, on behalf of Bosal.
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               We filed a motion to dismiss Bosal Nederland back
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     in August of last year to which there was no response from
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     direct purchaser plaintiffs. And in light of that lack of
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     response, we anticipated that it was unopposed, similar to
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     what happened with respect to the indirect purchaser
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                  They named one of our foreign entities, we filed
     plaintiffs.
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     a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and
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     after reviewing that motion they agreed to dismiss that
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     party. So not having a response, we expected that an order
     would be issued when this finally reached a point for the
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     Court to do so.
24
               A few weeks ago direct purchasers contacted us, and
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     not to put words in their mouth but I think they would say
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that it slipped through the crack, and we agreed we weren't going to request the Court to issue a decision. We were -- once the Court got to it and reviewed it, we anticipated a decision would be reached. So now they have reviewed it, and obviously it was our hope that they would say, like indirect purchasers did, that we will agree to dismiss, but they want to file a response in opposition.

So we -- it is our position that the correct procedure needs to be followed for them to do so, which would include a motion -- we think it should be a written motion rather than one here made to the Court for leave to file a response, a late response, to which then we can bring back to our client and review it and address it at that time. And, of course, filing a motion for leave to file a late response would obviously include their proposed response brief to which we can file our response, including a reply if necessary. So that's what we propose in terms of the procedure in light of where we stand today.

THE COURT: Okay. So your -- Mr. Hansel, your comment they don't object, apparently they may object?

MR. MOUW: We need an opportunity, Your Honor -- we spoke before. It was just this morning where I heard from Mr. Hansel that they are, in fact, going to oppose our motion to dismiss. Obviously we were hoping otherwise. So we will need an opportunity to see their motion. I haven't had an

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opportunity to consult with my client with respect to a
motion for leave to file. So it will be our position that
perhaps we will see the motion and we will just say we don't
object to the motion for leave and we will just deal with the
personal jurisdiction issue. But given the timing of this
morning and this just hearing of their position at 10:00, I
need the --
         THE COURT: Do you want argument on your motion?
         MR. MOUW:
                    Sorry?
                     Will you want argument on your motion?
                    We have requested it so far, but, again,
         MR. MOUW:
that may change in response to what we see from -- from DPPs,
and we might agree to stipulate for no oral argument.
when we filed our motion in August, we did request at that
point oral argument obviously to preserve that opportunity.
         THE COURT: Well, my inclination is I want to give
them -- because it slipped through a crack, I guess it was a
big crack because that was a long time ago. I want to get to
the merits, my aim is always to get to the merits, so I think
what I'm going to do, over your objection maybe, is to allow
them to file a answer and then set it for a hearing, and you
can argue the whole thing then at the hearing. You can
include the fact that they were late --
         MR. MOUW:
                    Sure.
         THE COURT: -- if you wish, but let's just move on.
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You respond --
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               MR. HANSEL: Yes, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: -- to the motion, include in your
     response to the motion just the fact that it wasn't addressed
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     before for whatever reason, and let's just set it up for a
     hearing at -- we can do it at our next status conference.
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 7
     Okay.
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               MR. MOUW: That sounds good, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Otherwise we just delay things.
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               MR. MOUW: Great.
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               MR. HANSEL: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay. Thank you. All right. I guess
     now we will go back to steering sensors.
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               MR. MILLER: Your Honor, Todd Miller for
     Tokai Rika.
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               The Court was notified that the motion on the
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     steering angle sensors is being deferred in light of a
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     resolution of the case by settlement, so we have --
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               THE COURT:
                           I'm sorry, I didn't --
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               MR. MILLER: The EPPs had notified the Court
     earlier this week.
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               THE COURT: Oh, wonderful. That takes care of that
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     motion.
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               MR. MILLER: Sorry.
               THE COURT: It takes care of that motion?
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MR. MILLER: Yes, it does, Your Honor, we hope.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay. All right. Then the next thing
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     we have on the schedule is the fairness hearing, but we have
     to wait until 1:00 to make sure nobody shows up, so let's
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     take a lunch break. We will resume at 1:00. Thank you very
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 6
     much.
               THE LAW CLERK: All rise. Court is in recess.
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 8
               (Court recessed at 12:01 p.m.)
 9
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               (Court reconvened at 1:01 p.m.; Court and Counsel
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               present.)
               THE LAW CLERK: All rise. Court is again in
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     session.
14
               THE COURT: Good afternoon.
               THE ATTORNEYS: (Collectively) good afternoon, Your
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16
     Honor.
               THE COURT: All right. We have the fairness
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     hearing in the ball bearings. Let's take that one.
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               MR. KOHN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Joseph Kohn
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     for the direct purchaser plaintiffs.
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               I'm pleased to be before you on these related
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     motions. I will be addressing the approval of the
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     settlement, and Mr. Hansel will address the counsel request
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     for costs and fees.
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               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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MR. KOHN: This is a settlement between the direct purchaser class and defendants MinebeaMitsumi Inc., NMB USA, Inc. and MNB Technologies Corp, together are referred to as the Minebea defendants.

Just to place a few dates on the record, we did file the standard report with respect to dissemination of notice dated February the 14th of 2018, and that recited that pursuant to the notice order, which was entered October 25th, 2017, the notices were mailed to the direct purchasers. There were a total of 1,047 notices mailed to class members as appeared on the information from the defendants. And the publication notice appeared on November 27th, 2017 in The Wall Street Journal and Automotive News and on the website.

Your Honor, this settlement agreement was executed just about a year ago, February 15th, 2017. It calls for a payment of \$9,750,000, which was made, has been deposited in escrow, as well as the defendants' cooperation.

This settlement had no provisions for reduction of the settlement amounts. It did have the right of the defendant to walk away, a recision right, which obviously has not occurred. We were happy to report that there were no opt-outs or objections with respect to this settlement, at least as of the report and as of the last time we checked. I don't know if somebody has shown up in the courtroom, but I

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think I recognize everyone here and I don't see any class members.

Your Honor, this settlement was the result of fairly lengthy negotiations. The small bearing matter came to light with an indictment in February of 2015 with respect to Minebea. The first direct purchaser action — we immediately began discussions with Minebea at that time. The first direct purchaser action was filed in November of 2015 naming NSK as a defendant. We have continued our discussions, exchange of information with Minebea, and really at the time that we concluded the settlement agreement was when we filed the complaint naming Minebea at that time, which was filed in March of 2017.

We have briefed the law with respect to settlement approval, Your Honor, beginning at page 5 of the brief with respect to this motion. I don't want to repeat the standards, obviously the couple we touch on; the complexity, likelihood of success in the case. I think the past month and a half has given another layer of meat on the bones to the complexity and the risks that are present in these types of litigation. I will just say that I'm a little more relaxed today than I was the last time I was here and perhaps more sanguine about the result of this motion than the last one.

We did have a certain amount of discovery, we did

have the benefit of proffers, we have received documents from NSK, we have received documents from Minebea, which were reviewed in connection of reaching this agreement.

I think the other factor to highlight or factors is the reaction of the class. We have had a handful of opt-outs in some of the settlements. We had no opt-outs in this one, and as has been throughout the --

THE COURT: I was going to say I thought you were talking about this one and I was going to say I didn't see any opt-outs.

MR. KOHN: Yeah. No, just I would say, you know, in the others where there has been, you know, two, three, four, five. And here and also no objections at any time in the DPP case, and happy to report again no objections from class members with respect to this settlement.

We submitted the proposed final judgment order which is a subject of the negotiation and stipulation with the defendant, and I had a revised final one because of the reference to -- some of the drafts will reference there were opt-outs, et cetera, so we just cleaned that language up.

So we believe on February 14th was the last time we submitted by the utility, and I have a paper copy of that version as well.

THE COURT: If you have a paper copy to give to -MR. KOHN: Yes.

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-- Molly, I just want to make sure we THE COURT: 1 2 have the last one. 3 MR. KOHN: You can crosscheck it against the one submitted on the 14th. 4 So with that, Your Honor, unless the Court has any 5 questions, I would then respectfully request the Court grant 6 approval of this settlement, which would conclude the 7 8 litigation for the Minebea defendants. They were an entity 9 that were not named by any of the other plaintiff classes or 10 any of the other parties. Thank you. 11 THE COURT: Okay. You've gone over the dates so I'm not going to go over all of the dates on this when I give 12 13 my opinion. 14 Okav. Mr. Hansel. 15 MR. HANSEL: May it please the Court, Your Honor, 16 I'm here to speak in support of direct purchaser plaintiffs' settlement class counsel's motion for an award of attorney 17 fees and out-of-pocket expenses in connection with Minebea 18 19 settlement. 20 As the Court is aware, the settlement amount is 21 \$9,750,000 plus the intangible qualitative relief of 22 cooperation, which is significant and something that we 23 believe is a major component of the settlement in connection 24 with pursuing the remaining claims against the NSK defendants who are NSK Limited, NSK Americas, Inc. and NSK Corporation. 25

So that litigation continues.

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Plaintiffs' counsel have diligently pursued this claim and worked hard to efficiently resolve the Minebea portion of the claim with the results that the Court has before Your Honor. That work included investigating the case, including the small bearings industry, drafting complaints, reviewing, analyzing and coding extensive documents, including many documents that we have reviewed and coded in the last couple of months. We deposed an NSK employee. We informally obtained relevant information through a proffer from the ACPERA applicant. We've engaged in lengthy arm's length settlement negotiations, prepared the settlement agreement, settlement notices and briefing on preliminary and final approval of the settlement. We worked with the claims administrator, and that work continues, and we continue the litigation against NSK.

We respectfully request an award of 30 percent of the settlement fund, which is consistent with some of our previous requests and our sort of generic attorneys' fee brief that we filed with the Court some time ago at the Court's request.

The percentage of the fund approach is the preferred approach in this circuit, and at this point in the litigation with this MDL having lasted as long as it has and there has been so many settlements presented to the Court, we

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find ourselves citing to Your Honor as much as any judge or circuit for the authorities that we rely on, but -- so the Court -- this Court, Your Honor, has awarded 30 percent before, most recently for the direct purchasers in the case of the wire harness settlements.

The Court has awarded the truck and equipment dealers 33 percent of a \$4.6 million settlement fund in the wire harness and OSS cases, and the auto dealers 33 and a third percent of a \$55 million wire harness settlement fund.

Other courts in the Sixth Circuit have also awarded fees in the 30 percent to one-third range.

There are the Pfizer -- Bowling vs. Pfizer factors for attorneys' fees, which the Court is familiar with, and I will try to just walk through those very quickly.

One is the benefit -- the value of the benefit, and here it is both the settlement amount and the cooperation.

The value of the services on an hourly basis, that takes a little more explanation. So with our original motion for attorneys' fees, at the time the lodestar of direct purchaser plaintiffs' counsel was about 1.2 million, which, if the Court granted a 30 percent fee, would result in a multiplier of 2.4. Since then with substantial additional work, particularly on document review and coding, our lodestar increased through the end of 2017 to 1.63 million, which, if the Court granted our requested fee of 30 percent,

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would result in a multiplier of 1.79 times. That multiplier is well within the range of positive lodestar multipliers found in the Sixth Circuit. For example, the Cardinal case cited in our brief observed that most courts agree that ranges of multipliers can go from 1.3 to 4.5 times, but in that case the Court awarded a multiplier of 6. So we are requesting a 30 percent fee, which would be a multiplier of 1.79, and, again, that's through the end of the year and we have occurred additional time since then and continued to litigation so it is actually lower than that. And, in fact, some courts suggest that counsel use current rates because of the delay in payment, and our practice is generally to use historic rates. So we -- you know, that if we use current rates, that would further reduce the multiplier, but we have not done that. So let's see here. The class's reaction to the settlement also supports the requested fee and expense award. In the notice to the class we informed the class that plaintiffs' counsel would request a fee of up to 33 and a

THE COURT: That was in your notice?

third percent of the Minebea settlement fund plus --

MR. HANSEL: That's in the notice, Your Honor, correct. And as the Court is aware, we are actually asking for a lower fee than that, but notwithstanding that, there were no objections and no requests for exclusion or opt-outs

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from the class. So it suggests that the class overwhelmingly
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     supports the settlement as a whole, which in the notice did
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     include the proposed fee.
               Our costs that we are seeking reimbursement of the
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     settlement fund are $18,475.47. We submitted on
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     December 20th a proposed order to chambers using either
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     e-mail or ECF utility. I do not have that hard copy with me
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     today, but we would be happy to have one hand-delivered to
 9
     chambers if that would be helpful. So --
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               THE COURT:
                           I would like to have it because I would
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     like the final last one to make sure that's the one we enter.
               MR. HANSEL: Yes. We will have that hand-delivered
12
     to chambers today.
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14
               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
15
                            Thank you. And so based on all of
               MR. HANSEL:
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     that, we respectfully ask the Court to award an attorneys'
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     fees of 30 percent of the settlement fund plus the expenses
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     of $18,475.47.
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               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
20
                            Thank you, Your Honor.
               MR. HANSEL:
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               THE COURT: Okay. And there is nobody here
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     objecting?
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               (No response.)
               THE COURT: All right. In terms of the approval of
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25
     the settlement, I'm not going to repeat everything that
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counsel said, but I find the notice was sufficient, it was very much in align with what we have been doing in all of our cases, and I think, Mr. Kohn, you said there was like a thousand something in terms of actual --

MR. KOHN: 1,047, and there's a declaration of the claims administrator that's attached to that report.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And I find that that along with the publication and I think it was The Wall Street Journal and Automotive News I think is sufficient notice. The deadlines for objections came and went and the Court received none. The Court received no notice of any opt-outs and there are none here today.

The Court finds the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate. The Court looks at any number of factors. The likelihood of success, and we have gone over this in our other ones, and we know that this is a very complex matter and certainly success is not guaranteed in these. It is, as I said, complex, and it has gone on for a long time, and it could have gone on for a lot longer, although Minebea is a relatively new party to our litigation here, but given the complexities and the expense and duration of the case, I find it is very reasonable.

Certainly the Court relies on the recommendation and the work of experienced counsel, and I have indicated this before that I think is counsel is -- has handled this

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case extremely well, and I do rely on their arm's length negotiations, which I believe has gone on here.

The discovery has been extensive in the whole litigation, and the class members as indicated appear to be satisfied because there is no commentary by way of either objection or opt out. And obviously as a class, the public is served to have this resolved. So the Court does find that this is a fair, reasonable and adequate settlement given all of the factors.

Now, the Court looked at the expenses here of the \$19,145, and the Court will award the expenses. I want the expenses as I have done before to come out of the total settlement first.

After that we look at attorney fees. Well, before I actually get to the attorney fees, I should get to the class issue, and the Court does find that the class should be certified. I want to say that first before I forget that. Certainly there is numerosity in terms of the numbers that we have indicated already, and there are questions of law that are common to the question as is typical of these antitrust cases, and this is a typical case, and here the direct purchasers' injuries arise from the named — from the same wrong as the named representatives.

And I find that their representation is adequate. I also find that Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied in that the

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plaintiffs demonstrate the common questions predominate over questions affecting individual members.

So going back to the fees now, the fees are always the thing that give me -- I have to tell you -- that give me the most concern because I want to be fair to all parties.

And I have read -- you referred back to those briefs which we had some time ago, and the Court has read those, and I have read any number of cases, and I will say that I have attended an any number of seminars on fees, and none it makes it any clearer to me unfortunately.

We talked about lodestar and there are so many factors that go into that timekeeping. The Court is aware that some courts hire auditors and appear to think that that's a very good thing to look at the timekeeping. I have not taken that approach, and I appreciate the approach but I don't find it to be truly satisfactory.

I think when we come down to it, the Court is going to here award the 30 percent that has been asked for. I have gone over the percentages, as you know, in other cases, 20, and I said I would look at it again later, and as wise as I guess I'm not, I couldn't come up with any good explanation between 20, 25 and 30, and I'm being perfectly blunt with you. We know these percentages stem from our personal injury before we got into all of these class actions, which was typical at 33 and a third percent.

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I look at this case and I say these parties probably — the plaintiffs would not have gotten anything. I mean, it would be so difficult to do this case on a one—on—one basis, and there is so much iffyness in it that to get involved in this and expend the money that you plaintiffs have expended in order to prosecute the civil litigation, I think you should be awarded, and since I know nothing better since defendants, of course, they don't care what you get, I'm going to go with the 30 percent.

I do look at the lodestar, for the record I want that to be clear, and I have looked at this one, which is a positive lodestar as to some of our others which were negative. But as I said, there's ways around this. I mean, if you raise your fees and the fees are crazy -- excuse me, I mean they are extremely high right now, you can change that lodestar. If you go to the fee that you started with, you know, it is a different lodestar.

So I have just determined that given the work that I have observed now through these years from the attorneys, I believe that -- I do really believe that you have given the time and the tremendous effort to do this and that you should be appropriately compensated, so I am awarding the 30 percent of the net settlement after the costs have been taken out, and you may present an order to that effect.

MR. KOHN: Thank you, Your Honor.

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Anything else?
               THE COURT:
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               MR. HANSEL: Your Honor, one question. Your Honor
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     read a number of costs, and the number I have from our brief
     is 18,475.47, and Your Honor read a $19,000 number. I'm not
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     sure where you got that from.
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               THE COURT: Yes. Where did I get that from?
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 7
     have 18,475 --
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               MR. HANSEL: That's --
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               THE LAW CLERK: It is because they had two
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     different numbers in the brief at two different spots.
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               MR. HANSEL: We did.
               THE COURT: Okay. The actual cost, Counsel.
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               MR. HANSEL: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                           Oh, you need to resubmit an order,
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     Molly tells me, because the order you submitted before is
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     different from what we have today.
               MR. HANSEL: The order is different because it was
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     not net of cost, and we'll submit one that's net of cost.
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               THE LAW CLERK: Not on the attorney fees; on the
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     approval of the settlement.
               MR. HANSEL: We will do.
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22
               THE COURT: Which is why I always like it at the
23
     last minute because the ones before sometimes get changed.
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     All right. Thank you.
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               (At 1:23 p.m. court recessed.)
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2	(Court reconvened at 2:31 p.m.; Court and Counsel
3	present.)
4	THE COURT: Good afternoon.
5	MS. FRUITERMAN: Good afternoon.
6	MR. PARKS: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: We are going to do the fairness hearing
8	on the TED matters.
9	MS. FRUITERMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
10	Erica Fruiterman, from Duane Morris, on behalf of the truck
11	and equipment dealership plaintiffs.
12	THE COURT: Just one second while I clear out some
13	of these papers here. Okay.
14	MS. FRUITERMAN: Your Honor, as you know, this
15	motion concerns our settlement with Mitsubishi Electric
16	Corporation, Mitsubishi Electric U.S. Holdings, Inc., and
17	Mitsubishi Electric Automotive America, Inc., collectively
18	the Mitsubishi Electric defendants.
19	This is the
20	THE COURT: Could you speak into the microphone a
21	little louder please.
22	MS. FRUITERMAN: This is the first settlement we
23	have reached in starters and alternators, and the total in
24	cash benefits to the class are \$1.3 million in addition to
25	the cooperation we are receiving from Mitsubishi Electric.

As set forth in our moving papers, we believe that this settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and on that basis should be granted final approval.

This specific definition of the settlement class is found in the settlement itself and is part of the public record in this case.

Regarding the cash amount of settlement, the amount was a function of several factors, including evidence of the defendants' conduct and our assessment of it, the volume of commerce affected or potentially affected, and the value of the noncash components of the settlement such as the cooperation I mentioned.

We believe that accounting for the prospects of success the defense has asserted, the volume of commerce impacted or potentially impacted, the risks of proceeding, we think that the settlement is a great outcome for the class.

On the topic of notice, notice was provided to the prospective class members in accordance with the notice plan approved by this Court. That notice plan is the same as the notice plan previously approved by the Court in bearings and also employed in settlements involving the ADP and their classes.

The notice plan was reviewed and determined to be fair and reasonable and appropriate by the firm that we are using, RG2, which the Court has previously approved for us to

use as consultants on notice-related issues.

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RG2 oversaw the execution of the notice plan as detailed in the declaration of Tina Chiango from RG2, which is attached to our moving papers.

Part of the notice procedure involved setting up a landing page on our website specifically for starters and alternators. That page went live on October 25th, 2017. RG2 also worked with a third-party marketing firm and arranged for summary notice to be e-mailed on November 20th, 2017 to 56,425 C level executives who worked at medium and heavy duty truck dealerships as well as agricultural, construction, mining, railroad and other commercial equipment dealers within the U.S.

We also mailed by first class bearings notice -sorry, starters and alternators notices to 47,230 addresses.

In addition to those mailings, an ad was placed in the weekly
newsletter of America Truck Dealers Association, and that
appeared each week for a month. Summary notice was also
released via a PR newswire and printed in The Wall Street

Journal, Automotive News and the November 2017 issue of Work
Truck. Also an ad was included in the National Trailer

Dealer Association e-newsletter.

We believe and represent to the Court that this notice program was thorough and was designed to reach and did reach a very large percentage of the potential class members.

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As has been the case with all our settlements, the reaction of the class members has been positive. There have been no objections filed, no appearances entered, and no opt-outs from the class.

We think given that, that it is important to emphasize their silence in terms of recognizing the approval of the class.

Turning to Rule 23 requirements, we believe that the requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied by the settlement. Just quickly walking through the factors considered by the Sixth Circuit, the first, likelihood of success on the merits weighed against the amount and form of relief in the settlement. In weighing the risks, we note that we are providing a large cash benefit of \$1.3 million to the class. This is in no way a nuisance value settlement amount. It is a substantial cash benefit to the class and reflects the strengths and claims and risks — the strengths and claims of our claims and the risk the settling defendants may prevail on some of their arguments.

The second factor is the complexity, expense and likely duration of further litigation. I think at this point the Court is well aware of the complexity of these cases and the claims and defenses in this litigation. With regard to expense, there would be significant expense for both the plaintiffs and the defendant to continue. And as to

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duration, we do not have class cert schedule and the litigation could continue for some time. So the second factor leans in favor of resolving these cases.

Our opinions concerning the settlement are set forth in our moving papers. Obviously we would not be here today if we did not think these were reasonable and fair settlements for the class.

And although formal discovery has not begun in these cases, we received extensive proffers from the ACPERA applicant in the cases but also pursued and obtained discovery directly from the settling defendants within the scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 408.

Through these means were able to obtain adequate information about the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and defenses and to evaluate the benefit of the settlement.

For these reasons, we find that the settlement is fair, reasonable and in the best interest of the class.

Again, the reaction of absent class members was positive. No objections, no opt-outs, and we believe their silence is a strong indication that the settlement class supports the adequacy of the settlement.

Moving to the sixth factor, no fraud or collusion took place in negotiating the settlement. This was an arm's length negotiation that occurred over many months over the phone and by e-mail.

Finally, we believe that the settlements are in the public interest. Settlements generally are, especially when resources are being provided to class members instead of funding the litigation.

Briefly, with regard to the Rule 23(a) and 23(b)

Briefly, with regard to the Rule 23(a) and 23(b) requirements as to numerosity, you know, given the number of named plaintiffs and the number of notices mailed, joinder here would be impractical. There are just simply too many parties for joiner.

As to commonality, common questions of law generally occur in price fixing cases such as this one. The main question was did the defendant enter into an illegal arrangement to affect the prices of starters and alternators, and that question was common for all plaintiffs and defendants.

Typicality. The claims of the class representative are indistinguishable from those of any class member.

And finally adequacy. In our opinion, the class representatives have adequately and fairly protected the interests of the class.

All right. In sum, the settlement is fair, reasonable, meets the Sixth Circuit factors as well as the Rule 23 requirements, and we respectfully ask that it be granted final approval.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

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MS. FRUITERMAN: Your Honor, would you like a copy
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     of the proposed order?
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               THE COURT: Yes, you could give it to my clerk,
     please.
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                               May I approach?
               MS. FRUITERMAN:
                           You may. Defense have any comment on
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               THE COURT:
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     this?
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               MR. FENSKE: Your Honor, Dan Fenske for the
     Mitsubishi Electric defendants.
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               We have nothing to add. We just urge the Court to
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     grant final approval to the settlement as fair, reasonable
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     and adequate for the reasons that counsel just discussed.
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               THE COURT: All right.
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               MR. FENSKE:
                            Thank you.
               THE COURT: The Court will rule on this before I
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     get to the attorney fee motion.
               Here the issue for the Court, as counsel has
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     indicated, is whether the settlement was fair, reasonable and
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     adequate. Defense agrees with plaintiff that it is. And the
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     settlement terms are 1.3 million I believe for the TED
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     plaintiffs.
               The Court looks at a number of factors that have
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     been referenced by plaintiff's counsel. I'm going to go over
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     them briefly for the record.
               Likelihood of success. Certainly success is not
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guaranteed in these cases, and by doing a settlement it does guarantee a recovery for the plaintiffs, and the class counsel believes in this case that the benefits of a settlement outweigh any risk of continued litigation.

Certainly this is complex. All of these antitrust cases have been quite complex, lengthy, and expensive. And as been indicated, we do not know when the case would be done as we haven't even gotten to the class cert timeline.

Experienced counsel believes that this is a fair, reasonable and adequate settlement, and the Court relies heavily on the -- on the beliefs of counsel, finding that counsel is well served, well experienced and able to negotiate these things at arm's length negotiations.

And obviously the settlement appears to be fair.

There were the notices which we will get into in a little bit, but we have no opt-outs and we have no objectors. The public is certainly served by having these matters resolved and saving the expense and time of the Court and the parties.

The next issue is about this notice, and the Court is satisfied that the notice is appropriate, that the service that provides -- I think it is RG2 -- is it RG2? Reminds me of a -- isn't there some movie about RDD2 or something? It just reminds me of that. But RG2 has done appropriate notices. The numbers have been, you know, 50-some thousand notices in one case and publications. So I find the notice

has been appropriate to actually notify, and including the -there was direct mail, wasn't there, also in this case?

Yeah, direct mail and e-mail that targeted the class members,
so I find that this is appropriate.

I also find that the class should be certified pursuant to Rule 23. Certainly the -- there are questions of fact that are common to the class, and we know here that the common question is whether these defendants engaged in this conspiracy or combination amongst themselves to fix, raise, maintain or stabilize the price of the component parts. And it is also -- also typicality is satisfied in that the claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class in that the class representatives can satisfy this claim.

I think there is also service awards, is there not, in your motion, Counsel -- yes -- coming up for the named class plaintiffs because of the work that they have, in fact, done in this case.

There is -- not only do these individuals adequately represent the class counsel but adequately represents the class, and I believe that the plaintiff representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class and also the attorneys.

Because TED plaintiffs meet the requirements of 23(a), then I look at 23(b)(3), that the class demonstrates

common questions predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and the evidence here that would show a violation to one settlement class member is, in fact, common to the class and will provide a violation to all.

A class action is a superior method, I firmly believe, in adjudicating these claims. And as we know, all of these claims have been centralized here, and I think that this is an efficient mechanism to resolve these claims.

So I do find that the class as named and defined in the pleadings is the appropriate way to handle this. So the Court approves the settlement and I approve the -- certify the class for purposes of the settlement.

MS. FRUITERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's go to attorney fees and service awards.

MS. FRUITERMAN: So as Your Honor mentioned, this motion is for attorney fees, reimbursement of litigation expenses and service awards. This motion covers the period from the inception of the case until January 26th, 2018.

As the Court is aware, we have been litigating this case, like our other cases, on a contingency fee basis with no guarantee of recovery of our fees. We are seeking fees here equal to 30 percent of the settlement amount after notice and claims administration costs and escrow fees have been deducted. 30 percent equals approximately \$367,000.

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With regards to the lodestar crosscheck employed by the Court, the \$367,000 in fees is approximately 100 percent of the lodestar and represents a multiplier of one. This lodestar includes attorney hours for attorneys at Duane Morris, paralegals, library staff and technology assistants who are similar to our project managers but mostly manage the processing of data and preparing files for review and production.

The total hours is approximately 630, and these hours do not include time spent after January 26th preparing motion papers and dealing with claims administration. The specific hours and amounts are set forth in my declaration attached to this motion.

And I would like to note that although not as active as the bearings and wire harness case because formal discovery has not yet commenced, informal discovery has been a significant part of our efforts in the settlement context, including review of information received in proffers and Rule 408 volume of commerce materials.

The multiplier here is approximately one, but as Your Honor has stated, the multiplier may be useful as a crosscheck but it is not necessary in this circuit in assessing the appropriate percentage in the percentage of the fund approach.

Although we have received 33 and a third in earlier

requests for attorney fees from this Court, we now ask for 1 2 30 percent in response to Your Honor's decision at our last 3 final approval hearing where you found that 30 percent was a reasonable percentage in light of the common range of 25 to 4 5 35 percent. In our opinion, a 30 percent fee based on the 6 7 percentage of the fund approach that we set forth in our 8 motion is well within the range of reasonable attorney fees 9 awards approved of and awarded in the Sixth Circuit as well 10 as this Court in the truck and equipment dealers prior settlements, and so we respectfully request that award here 11 as well as reimbursement of our litigation expenses. 12 13 With respect to the requested services awards, here 14 the class --15 How many named plaintiffs do you have? THE COURT: 16 MS. FRUITERMAN: Twenty, Your Honor. THE COURT: 17 Pardon me? 18 MS. FRUITERMAN: Twenty. 19 THE COURT: And you are looking for the \$5,000 for 20 each of those 20? 21 MS. FRUITERMAN: Correct. Here the class 22 representatives performed and continue to perform an 23 invaluable service to the class. As you are aware, the class representatives have produced and continue to produce 24 25 documents in response to the discovery efforts of the MDL

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defendants. Specifically, recently the class has been asked to locate dealer files in accordance with Your Honor's motion that truck and equipment dealer plaintiffs needed to produce those. So the location and identification of those dealer files, as we set forth in our opposition, is quite a burden and involves not just one centralized location but requires each individual dealership to go to their files and sometimes go off site to locations where those files are stored. THE COURT: Do you have an estimate of how much time these individual plaintiffs put into this? MS. FRUITERMAN: On an individual plaintiff by plaintiff basis, I do not, Your Honor. I can say that it is certainly over -- at least over 100 hours in terms of back and forth conversations and discussions with the class representatives. I know that in addition to the conversations that we have had, the class representatives have had to go to each of their dealerships and talk to them. There is also extensive time spent in finding out where the dealer files are located and figuring out what the most cost effective way of extracting those files from those locations is. So your experience in working with THE COURT: them, you are telling me that they expended at least 100 hours each gathering this information? MS. FRUITERMAN: No, I could not break it down by

dealership, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: You're saying 100 hours total?

MS. FRUITERMAN: 100 hours in our direct negotiations with counsel for the class representative. And in addition to that back and forth with counsel, I know that each dealership has had to search its own files. I can't speak to exactly how much time each of those searches took.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm trying to pinpoint the \$5,000 to each and find what -- you know, if they should get that, so if they in total spent 100 hours, so they are basically five hours each one, and then they had to get their records.

MS. FRUITERMAN: It's more than five hours each one, Your Honor. I can't speak to how much more, but in -- so, if you will remember, lots of the dealer files are located off site and housed with Iron Mountain, so as an initial matter, the dealership needs to determine whether it has those files in its -- in the location. If it doesn't, then it needs to contact Iron Mountain, find out where those files are, and in many cases those files will be labeled by box but not in any way -- you know, you can't go straight into the box and know that it is going to there be or where it is going to be in the box. So that sifting process of trying to locate the files is going to be different for each dealership because they don't store their files all in the

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same method.
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               THE COURT: All right.
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                                In addition, I just want to
               MS. FRUITERMAN:
     mention without these class representatives' willingness to
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     bring claims and undertake these efforts, there would be no
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     settlement for the truck and equipment dealership class.
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     as discovery proceeds, the class representatives are likely
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     to incur significant burden and expense.
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               So because of the efforts expended by the class
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     representatives and the reasonableness of the award, we
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     respectfully request $5,000 for each named plaintiff.
                                  In terms of the named
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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     plaintiffs, I'm a little more concerned because I don't know
     their time as to what they put in. I'm trying to make this
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15
     reasonable.
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               MS. FRUITERMAN: I understand, Your Honor.
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     past we have requested a larger fee that I think represents
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     some of those earlier efforts at the initial document
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     collection at the start of the wire harness and bearings
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     litigation and so request $5,000 here because acknowledging
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     that the burden, although it still exists, doesn't involve
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     quite the same search for documents and production as it did
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     in the early stages of the case.
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               THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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               MS. FRUITERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: All right. The Court will award the service fee of the \$5,000 to each of the named plaintiffs because I find, though I don't have records, which does concern me, of time that they spent, I am aware of the records and the volume of the records that they had to discover and submit in discovery, plus the time that they spent individually with the counsel.

The Court will award the costs which come to \$38,347.78.

MS. FRUITERMAN: That's correct.

THE COURT: That will come out of -- off the top of the settlement, along with the amount that's being paid to the individual plaintiffs as a service award, and then the attorneys will get their one -- their 30 percent. The Court has gone back and forth I realize with these attorney fees, and as I indicated, you probably weren't here, but in the last fairness hearing we had earlier this afternoon I've just come to the conclusion that the Court would use a percentage of the fund -- a flat percentage of the fund of 30 percent in these cases and I would crosscheck it. Now, here the lodestar crosscheck is one, so it is like you are getting paid actually what you put into it, and I believe -- I'm not going over all of those numbers, but the multiplication works out to what you had in your brief.

We know that the Court has to look at various

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factors, and that's the value of the benefit rendered, the society's stake in awarding attorney fees, whether the services were undertaken on a contingency fee basis, the complexity, the professional skill and the value of the services on an hourly basis. We are not breaking these down individually because we have touched on a lot of these. have indicated to you that the Court is impressed with the skill of counsel and I have no problem with the hourly basis and the number of hours that it's put in here. And most importantly, that this was taken with no quarantee of success and that the plaintiffs have put forth their own -- counsel have put forth the funds in order to proceed and to get these results and I think the results are excellent. And that there's a strong national interest in these antitrust cases to enforce and to vindicate public That the case is very complex, and I think obviously here the lodestar confirms the percentage. So the Court will award the 30 percent of the net proceeds. MS. FRUITERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I also have a copy of the proposed order if you would like. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. If you would give

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. If you would give that to my clerk, we can get that entered. Anything else?

MR. FENSKE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Defense? No? I'm not used to seeing defense on the plaintiff's side. You know, this is -- we

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always do this in this MDL, I don't know why, maybe because
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     our defense counsel generally sits in the jury box, so
 3
     that's --
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               MR. FENSKE: There are a few more of us, Your
 5
     Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay. Yeah. Thank you very much.
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                            Thank you, Your Honor.
               MR. FENSKE:
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               MS. FRUITERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               (Proceedings concluded at 2:59 p.m.)
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1	CERTIFICATION
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3	I, Robert L. Smith, Official Court Reporter of
4	the United States District Court, Eastern District of
5	Michigan, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28,
6	United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the
7	foregoing pages comprise a full, true and correct transcript
8	taken in the matter of In Re: Automotive Parts Antitrust
9	Litigation, Case No. 12-02311, on Wednesday,
10	February 28, 2018.
11	
12	
13	s/Robert L. Smith Robert L. Smith, RPR, CSR 5098
14	Federal Official Court Reporter United States District Court
15	Eastern District of Michigan
16	
17	
18	Date: 03/23/2018
19	Detroit, Michigan
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